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REGIONS OF DASEIN: 50 QUESTIONS ABOUT HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY

Summary

This book is a series of dialogues between Tomas Kačerauskas, translator of Martin Heidegger's magnum opus *Being and Time* into Lithuanian, and Tautvydas Vėželis, who initiated this project. The book consists of three parts. The discussion focuses primarily on the conception of the world and on the explication of Dasein in Heidegger's work *Being and Time*. The analysis of existential structures of Dasein presents the modes of being. The dialogues appeal to the subtle distinctions between ontological existentials and categories in fundamental ontology of Heidegger. The first part (The Regions of Beings) discusses the necessity, structure and priority of the question of being. The second part (The A priori Structures of Dasein's Existentiality) deals with Heideggerian problems concerning the notion of truth in the history of Western thought. The third part (An Analysis of Meaning in Heidegger's Fundamental Ontology) considers issues of Heideggerian time.

I. The Regions of Beings

The first part consists of 17 questions. In Question 1, Kačerauskas presents his motivations for translating *Being and Time*, including his scientific interests, training at Freiburg university in Germany, his wish to redeem his "debt" to the Lithuanian philosophical community which educated him, and his wish to take a break in his philosophical activity. He also discusses how he came to understand *Being and Time*. According to Kačerauskas, the Heideggerian word has an astounding characteristic to appeal to being while representing everydayness (Question 2). Heidegger's many neologisms are rooted in his mother-tongue. It is we, translators and interpreters, who mystify Heidegger, who appeals to being with things and among them. Kačerauskas discusses the greatest hardships of translation, the most important of which are interpretative and hermeneutic, i.e. how to understand Heidegger. His criteria as a translator are clarity, felicity, naturalness and precision of language (Question 3). Kačerauskas notes that critique of *Being and Time* as a vapid and meaningless text simply demonstrates *Being and Time's* outstandingness, i.e. its resourcefulness in breaking with the philosophical tradition of contemplating being (Question 4).

Question 5 is devoted to the meaning of Heidegger's concept of being, which he searches for in the vicinity of its meaninglessness and ambiguity. The author develops this meaning with the help of the concept of Dasein, existential analytics and phenomenological positions. Question 6 deals with the nuances of translating the term "being" (*Sein*) in various compound words. A destructive approach is apparent in the author's intention to reveal the concept of being which has been covered up by Platonic and Aristotelian tradition. In Question 7, Kačerauskas brings to attention Heidegger's flirt with Aristotle. The latter is not simply criticized in *Being and Time* for his metaphysical positions which point beyond the world. Heidegger is intrigued by Aristotle's attention to a dynamic world in time and space, his conception of a thing's essence as lying within the thing itself, and his notion of the primary substance. Question 8 deals with Aristotle's notions which take on new meanings inseparable from the project of Dasein in *Being and Time*. According to Kačerauskas, there is not and cannot be any Aristotle per se, there is only the Aristotle who has influenced the development of ideas including Heidegger's existential ontology. This question also addresses the circumstances of *Being and Time's* appearance. Lastly, Question 8 deals with the superstitions with regards to being that are discussed in the introduction of *Being and Time*.

Question 9 deals with the difference between ontological and ontic approaches. Additionally, Kačerauskas presents here Figure 1 "Directions of the Question of Being." Question 10 deals with the foundations of Heidegger's investigation presented in the second paragraph of *Being and Time*. Ipso facto, the tension is analysed in the ontological difference between beings (*Seiende*), being (*Sein*) and Dasein. Heidegger's program can be summarized as follows: being is not thought without beings (*Seiende*), which arise here, creating the meaning of its being. Question 11 deals with the term *ὄντῶν* and with its Latin equivalent *substantia*. According to Kačerauskas, *ὄντῶν* refers to beings' (*Seiende*) temporal being (*Sein*) and is connected with speaking (*Sprechen*), which differentiates speech (*Ansprechen*) and discussion (*Besprechen*). In discussing *substantia*, Kačerauskas disagrees with Vėželis by stressing that it is not so much a logical predicate as a notion which refers to this world. In Question 12, the meanings of truth in *Being and Time* are discussed in the wider context of conceptions of truth. Kačerauskas points to the proximity of pragmatic and Heideggerian conceptions of truth. Additionally, the topics of hermeneutic circle and authenticity are analysed in the context of the question of truth.

Question 13 considers Chapter 7 of *Being and Time*. This chapter deals with the etymology of phenomenology and with the maxim of returning to things. According to Kačerauskas, things here are things at hand which not only direct our thinking and living but also show and reveal being-toward-death. Things at hand and temporal being constitute a hermeneutic circle: things are at hand in that they show our being-toward-death, by which they are at hand. Kačerauskas treats phenomenology in the context of Heidegger as a position of openness and care

for the world. Four meanings of the word “phenomenon” are discussed and it is asserted that a peculiarity of phenomena is that changes in meaning function like changes in illumination. In general, Heidegger’s phenomenology, which encompasses both the destruction of tradition and a project (*Entwurf*) of possibilities, unfolds on the horizon of hermeneutics and existential ontology.

Question 14 analyses the following meanings of *λόγος* in *Being and Time*: speaking (*Sprechen*), revealing (*Offenbarung*), and speech (*Ansprechen*). In *Being and Time*, phenomenology is connected with both hermeneutics and existential analytics. Question 15 explores the Heideggerian associations of the concept “transcendence”. Used with quotation marks, it signifies not so much what is beyond this world but rather the antinomies of traditional epistemology and Christian nonproblematic dogmatism. Without quotation marks, it is associated with the characteristics of *Dasein*, such as temporality, worldliness, and historicity.

II. The A priori Structures of *Dasein*’s Existentiality

In Part II, 14 more questions are discussed. Question 16 analyses the topic of the world. Kačerauskas appeals to the six chapters of Division One to state that the world is worldly inasmuch as within it unfolds being, which requires surroundings and circumstances. Even more so, worldliness arises from *Dasein*’s coexistence with others, even if that leads to the sameness of the they (*das Man*), i.e. to simply doing what others are doing. Finally, worldliness is also represented by such existentials as fear, angst, idle talk, curiosity, ambiguity, falling prey, thrownness and care. Appealing to *Being and Time*, Kačerauskas defines understanding as *Dasein*’s moving ahead and looking back yet not returning.

Question 17 deals with the concept of truth. It is asserted that the Heideggerian concept of truth is not so much original as the integration of earlier conceptions. Heidegger appeals to Albert Einstein’s generation of scientists and worries about crises, turning points the “relativisms” in the sciences. The aspects of truth which arise only in *Dasein*’s circumstances are simplicity, applicability, clarity and availability. Vėželis asks whether truth vanishes when *Dasein* is gone. Kačerauskas answers that the disappearance of *Dasein*, i.e. its being towards death is itself an aspect of truth. The world exists for *Dasein* and for its existence in the world and nowhere else. Analogously, the world is true for *Dasein* and for its existence towards death. In other words, the world is true by disappearing from us, the *Daseins*.

Question 18 discusses Heidegger’s notions and concepts related to the world. Here, for the first time in Lithuanian, is presented a table (Table 1) of concepts which describe the world, in German as well, with page numbers from both the original text and the translation. Question 19 further discusses the concept of

the world in *Being and Time*. What arises before our eyes, the surrounding world (*Umwelt*) or region (*Gegend*), forms the image of the world, by which we resolve to change the world. The criterion of a phenomenon's authenticity is, in fact, its outstandingness, i.e. its ability to capture our attention. From the moment they arise before our eyes, they become the phenomena which make up our world. Furthermore, these phenomena are so interlinked that one brings out another and one is understood in the context of another. That is why there is not and cannot be any negative evaluation in speaking about the phenomena of everyday life, such as ambiguity or falling prey. Ambiguity is precisely that which lets one see both the world and the "world", and falling prey is an aspect of worldliness. We are in the world that we form by our very being. To be here means to be in particular surroundings, in our own world. The so-called inauthentic being which separates the world from "the world" is also a function of authentic being, i.e. an existential.

Table 1 exhibits the concepts that characterise the world. In these concepts, world and being are inseparable. This shows that Dasein and worldliness interact with each other. The world becomes more spacious because of Dasein within it and Dasein becomes freer in belonging to it. The criterion of authenticity here is also worldliness. It is not the case that the region of language (thinking) and the world correspond to authentic being while "the world" and the region of speaking (idle talk) correspond to inauthentic being. This relationship is more complicated. On the one hand, thinking often ignores worldly being. On the other hand, idle talk together with ambiguity and curiosity are considered existentials which open up authentic (worldly and temporal) being. Figure 2 shows the regions of the world including language and speaking and their intersection in the face of both the world of things and the "world" of things. Authentic being intersects with inauthentic being. Dasein is fulfilled in dying while its world (inasmuch as it settled that world) opens up in its deathbed. In answering Vėželis's question, whether the world is only Dasein's, Kačerauskas states that in mortifying ourselves we fulfil our world.

Question 20 is devoted to the conception of language, and also to the distinction of attunement (*Befindlichkeit*) and understanding (*Verstehen*). On the basis of paragraph 67, Kačerauskas analyses the interplay between consciousness, understanding and language, and also the relationship between phenomenology, hermeneutics and philosophy of language. Heidegger profoundly supplemented the above mentioned directions despite his standing apart from them. He developed them as inseparable from each other (i.e. ignoring the advantages of specialization) in the context of his existential ontology. Kačerauskas asserts that understanding is impossible without attunement which indeed signifies the "here" (*da*) of Dasein, i.e. its place inseparable from time. Dasein's thrownness into the world, its temporal being and its attunement to mood are all inseparable. These three things determine each other. Figure 3 shows the hermeneutic interconnection

between temporal being, thrownness into the world and attunement to mood. Figure 4 shows the interconnection between attunement, understanding and being (temporal and spatial) in the world. Attunement is introduced in *Being and Time* as an ontological tool of mood. Mood is inseparable from the phenomena of fear and angst which are analysed further. Fear is to be related to nothingness as regards authenticity and a jumble (*Gewirr*) of the possibilities. Attunement to angst and fear (as to other existentials, including ambiguity) chokes Dasein and makes it forget itself by opening up its possibilities. If so, there can be no talk of avoiding angst, fear, idle talk or ambiguity. It is inauthentic environment which in fact suggests avoiding them. Angst appeals to a certain abstractness of mood. Attunement to angst is self-restrained, that is, held (*gehalten*). This restraint is not only a holding of past and future but also the cultivation of a resolve to leap. Angst opens up a resolute Dasein's authentic possibilities while fear mixes them up and covers them up. In part, fear is angst's negative partner, yet no less real because of it. Fear highlights the role of angst and attunement in general. Understanding and attunement are also inseparable in another respect. They are both considered the structural components of care. The third component, also an existential, is falling prey.

In question 21, existentials are explored further. Figure 5 shows the structural connections between existentials. Idle talk is considered an existential alongside understanding, attunement, and falling prey. However, idle talk is also presented as a structural component of falling prey, along with curiosity and ambiguity. This inconsistent status (and identity) of idle talk expresses its ambiguous nature. As an existential, it bears witness to Dasein's falling prey, which should be associated with worldliness and temporality. As part of falling prey, it borders on ambiguity and curiosity. Be that as it may, idle talk is ambiguous not so much as an inauthentic phenomena, but as an existential. Figure 6 systematizes all of the fundamental and nonfundamental existentials which Heidegger mentions in *Being and Time*, along with their relationships. They are grouped into a hierarchy of three levels. However, some existentials are identified with more than one level. Existentials interact along certain crosssections. One of these is their ecstatic nature, i.e. the trinity of temporal modes. Just as the temporality of speaking expresses its ecstatic nature, i.e. being-a-whole (*Ganzsein*) of time's existential modes, so likewise, the existentiality of speaking expresses that it is inseparable from other existentials of different levels, including understanding.

Question 22 deals with silence. The following paradox is shown: by publicizing creative outstandingness, we level it, silence it and ultimately make it not outstanding. As a possibility, silence is a fundamental existential, although not of the first level. Even more, it is the possibility of another existential, speaking. Finally, it is a means of understanding (*Verstehen*) (one more existential), which brings one closer to authentic understanding (*Verständnis*). Silence is thus a knot of several

existentials which ensures their interconnections, as well as communication in general. There is a certain symmetry and mutual dependence between silence and speaking. Authentic silence is necessarily associated with the possibilities that speaking opens up; authentic speaking – with restrained (retentive) silence. In Figure 7, silence is shown as a knot of existentials – understanding, being, speaking and meaning. One aspect of silence is a certain incomprehension which not only should be contrasted with common sense (*Verständigkeit*) of the they (*das Man*), but also should be held to adjoin Dasein's perpetual projectedness and disclosedness. Upon understanding everything, we close off from ourselves. We do not fully understand neither alarm (*Grauen*), nor angst, nor death, nor finally, our own being. The silence of conscience, otherwise its character-of-nothingness (*Nichtcharakter*), is the key to authenticity and existentiality. Our conscience is the silent witness of our being. Existential is the one who is connected with existentials which open up being, including through its character-of-nothingness (or silence) of its entry ways. According to Kačerauskas, those who do not discern existentials such as “the they” (*das Man*) and idle talk, which open up possibilities, do persist in the existent (ontic) level. Conscience is the silent transition from the existent region into the existential one.

In Question 23, Kačerauskas analyses authenticity, which Theodor W. Adorno criticized, and also the project (*Entwurf*) which is inseparable not only from worldliness but also from understanding. Authentic being is ever becoming, projecting itself and thus opening up the world for itself. Authentic (*eigentlich*) is not the fact of being but rather that being “something more”, which we become. Heidegger raises a completely contrary point, that which not simply “is”, that which we move towards and that by which we tear ourselves out of “the they” to look back at our authentic identity. Question 24 is about everydayness. Everydayness is treated not as an “aspect” of Dasein, but as an a priori structure of existentiality, even if it supposes fleeing (*Flucht*) from it and into the forgetting of oneself. Even so, precisely this ontic averageness leads to “the ontological determinations of an authentic being of Dasein” (1996: 44). First, averageness (accompanied by distantiality (*Abständigkeit*), leveling down (*Einebnung*), publicity, disburdening (*Entlastung*) of being and accommodation (*Entgegenkommen*)) leads to the idea of worldliness. Second, “the they” (*das Man*) averageness, having knocked down Dasein to the very depths of they-self (*Man-selbst*), forces it to face its „ownmost potentiality in its being“ (1996: 181). Third, angst, which overcomes one in the depths of existence “fetches Dasein back out of its entangled absorption in the “world”” (1996: 189). The fact that there is not and cannot be an average everyday personal death brings one back from circumstances of “the they”.

Question 25 deals with “the they” (*das Man*), which in *Being and Time* is treated as an existential. One of the existential meanings of “the they” is to cover (*verdecken*) so that Dasein, in moving towards death, would discover (*entdeckt*)

and reveal itself. Another meaning is its sociability which resonates with worldliness. “The they” presupposes a social medium where popular opinion thrives. According to Kačerauskas, existential ontology and its component, the concept “the they”, has nothing to do with elitism, which presupposes the distinctiveness of an intellectual, a philosopher or a researcher of Heidegger. The indefiniteness of “the they” in a certain sense grounds possibility. Possibilities arise in an environment which is sufficiently undefined though yet contextual. “The they” are characterized by averageness and its quality of levelling down (*Einebnung*). Another characteristic of “the they” is the disburdening (*Entlastung*) or unburdening Dasein in its everydayness. Disburdening is related to the production of happiness. A mediated society takes up an individual’s (*Dasein*’s) burden, which it ships off no one knows where, which is to say, down the channels of mass communication. On the one hand, “the they” is associated with a certain moral rigorism (fixed propriety); on the other hand, it is “the they” who bear responsibility for certain ethical deviations by an individual, having taken over from that individual responsibility for his or her actions. As an individual’s freedom and responsibility vanish, one more characteristic of “the they” emerges, i.e. the nothing-character (*Nichtcharakter*). Other characteristics of “the they” are as follows: accommodation (*Entgegenkommen*), distanciality (*Abständigkeit*), publicity, absence of objective presence (*Unvorhandenheit*) and concealment. Figure 8 shows all of these characteristics and their interconnections. Worldliness reveals itself in no other way than through they and its variant, they-self (*Man-selbst*). In other words, “the they” is that, thanks to which discoveredness (*Entdecktheit*) is possible in general, even if it covers the existential truth. “The they” not only provokes the discovery (*Entdeckung*) of covered Dasein and its world but also belongs to its “fundamental constitution”. “The they” is an aspect of Dasein. Being in the world is everyday and average. Dasein must wallow in “the they” in order to cast it off in a moment and commit to authentic being.

Question 26 compares the categories *Befindlichkeit* and *Stimmung*, *Vorhandenheit* and *Zuhandenheit*. Attunement (*Befindlichkeit*) is compared with understanding and is characterised as a worldview which, with regard to it, is autonomous (not reduced to understanding). Heidegger introduces the concept „objective presence” (*Vorhandenheit*) by dividing the overly broad and vague Latin *existentia* into „the interpretive expression objective presence“ (1996: 42) and existence, which he attributes only to Dasein. Objective presence must be understood from the perspective of handiness. In general, phenomenology appeals to the fact that a thing, in participating in Dasein’s being, reveals itself (*offenbart sich*) and opens up the existential facets of this being. On the other hand, what is most at hand (*zuhanden*) and objectively present (*vorhanden*) is what emerges by unexpectedly revealing unseen sides of worldly Dasein and the things which surround it.

Kačerauskas then replies to Vėželis's question (Question 27), what does he disagree with in *Being and Time*? According to Kačerauskas, in trying to understand *Being and Time*, we seek our own authentic being as well as our path to understanding along which we travel as we study this book further. The phenomenon of discipleship manifests: every disciple attempts to surpass their teacher by going their own way, which their teacher pushes them towards. The best way of understanding *Being and Time* is to allow ourselves to be pushed by it into our own (authentic) activity. *Being and Time* should push one into activity; that is the key to authentic understanding.

Question 28 analyses the existential of thrownness (*Geworfenheit*). In reply to Vėželis's charge that it is banally interpreted, Kačerauskas notes that the greatest banalities are just one step away from authenticity. This is because of their everydayness, but also they move one to interpret differently. In general, banality is most necessary for nonbanality to express itself. Banality is a necessary background for nonbanalities to emerge. Thrownness appeals to Dasein's circumstantialness, and more broadly, to worldliness. Thrownness, being-in and worldliness are aspects of each other which help to explain each other. Dasein is thrown into the world, more precisely, into its worldly environment as indicated by "here" (*Da*), and the main content of its being is being in its worldly and temporal surroundings, i.e. being-in. Thrownness not only appeals to the fact that we are thrown into our language and into our social environment as well, but it also allows these two levels to intersect. Moreover, thrownness is the aspect of our mobility. Thrownness is connected with attunement that opens us up, and also with possibilities, in that a being understands itself through them. The parallel between thrownness (*Geworfenheit*) and projectedness (*Entworfenheit*) is inevitable, in terms of both meaning and significance. Being thrown into our everyday surroundings, we can project ourselves onto the possibilities that open to us, i.e. rise above these surroundings. We are thrown into a region of both significance and meaning, but this thrownness presupposes the possibility of a mobile project, and at the same time, the resoluteness of authentic being. Heidegger speaks about thrownness into death. We should fear death because this fear, in other words, thrownness into death, opens up our authentic being and understanding. Also, thrownness into death ensures the symmetry of attunement and understanding in existential ontology. Thrownness itself is opened up through attunement (mood), which is the other side of understanding. In Heideggerian terms, they are equiprimordial (*gleichursprünglich*). *Being and Time* deals also with the thrownness into existence. Thrownness is to be understood as inseparable from projecting and falling prey. We must be sufficiently removed from ourselves in order to move towards our identity. Consequently, thrownness into the world (ipso facto, into social surroundings) appeals to a certain spaciousness that allows for motion towards oneself, i.e. the projecting of one's identity onto the horizon of emerging

possibilities. It is also a certain regionalism as we are thrown here, into a proximate, finite, encountered world to be cared rather than a global boundless space. Nullity is a certain “empty space” for possibilities that should remain sufficiently free that Dasein, which itself is simply an outline projected onto its surroundings, could project itself upon them as weft upon warp.

Question 29 deals with falling prey (*Verfallen*) and the fall (*Verfall*). Vėželis mentions George Steiner’s interpretation. According to Kačerauskas, the phenomena of morality, ethics and theology open up not in heights of scientific schemas, but conscientiously being in the world. The notion “fall” has no existential (nor theological) connotation. Falling prey and the associated inauthentic being are precisely that which can open up authentic being. In other words, it is because of falling prey that we can open ourselves up to our authentic being towards death. In Question 30, Vėželis returns again to Heidegger’s worldliness contrasting it with the Cartesian conception of space. Kačerauskas acknowledges the importance of René Descartes both for the origins of phenomenology and also to Heidegger who purportedly criticizes him. However, Kačerauskas points out that Heidegger first interprets Descartes from his own perspective on worldliness and then later opposes him.

In the last question of Part II (Question 31), Vėželis further provokes Kačerauskas on the topic of worldliness in mentioning the example of a bench in a lecture hall. According to Kačerauskas, the beings “within” the world characterize the world, and the latter, as a container for the beings, characterizes things. Nevertheless, Dasein, being in the world, refers to something more than the latter’s spacialness, that is, its ability to encompass Dasein. Yet again, worldliness as regards Dasein refers also to something more than spacialness, namely temporality and sociality. The world is worldly by encompassing Dasein, i.e. giving being to Dasein. We orient ourselves in this very world of Dasein’s existential manifestation. In a different world, we would simply have no possibility to orient ourselves.

III. An Analysis of Meaning in Heidegger’s Fundamental Ontology

Part III consists of 19 questions. Question 32 analyses Heidegger’s conception of time. Heidegger develops the topic of the ecstatic of Dasein’s time, i.e. the unity of past, present and future. Thrown Dasein’s temporality is inseparable from its worldly openness. Therefore we speak of ecstatically-horizontal temporality, i.e. of the “here” of the present, which is inseparable from Dasein’s past (history) and its expectations (for the future). According to Kačerauskas, Heidegger does not criticize, but launches off of the vulgar (everyday) conception of time, to which he grants authentic content, i.e. Dasein’s resolute self-projecting. So-called objective

time, which is purportedly disconnected from the vulgar conception of time is an attempt to conceal time's existential fatality (being towards death). Question 33 deals further with the topic of time. Dasein's authentic time anticipates any objective time. Dasein's time appeals to the fore-conception of a moment. Temporality (of understanding, objective presence, falling prey, and speaking) appeals to the wholeness of everydayness which, as mentioned, is another facet of Dasein's time. All three modes of time form as if a three-dimensional space of Dasein's being in the world which gives being towards death its fullness. Objectivity should be searched for within this fullness and not apart from Dasein's time, which should be understood existentially.

Question 34 addresses the difference between historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*) and historiography (*Historie*). Speaking about historicity, Heidegger appeals to the history of Dasein's being towards death. Historiography should be associated with the science of history, which, as with every science, seeks to demarcate itself from "nonobjective" impurities proposed by the position of an existing observer. Historicity is related to ontology, whereas historiography is related to the ontic. Heidegger notes the limits of historiography. On the one hand, the scientific approach "to show the facts, such as they were" is of itself naïve since it neglects the phenomenological context in which the facts emerge. On the other hand, historiography ignores existential connections, i.e. the impact of "dead" historical "facts" on our being towards death. Even though they are dead, they are alive as nothing else in that they influence our being towards death.

Question 35 analyses the relationship between care (*Sorge*), temporality and authenticity. Carefulness (*Sorgfalt*) is an aspect of worldliness. A human being (Dasein) is to be grateful to care, that which opens up possibilities to them, for the project on which they mould their identity. Ipso facto, a human being has been thrown into a world they care about (*besorgte Welt*). As a result, care is the other side of thrownness. Heidegger calls this double nature (ambiguity?) of care its groundedness. This structure of care approachable for an ontological view grounds its ontic approach, according to which human behaviour is weighted down by care. The ontic of care is derivative compared to its ontology.

Question 36 deals further with the topic of care from the perspective of reality. Real is that which is at hand (*zuhanden*) and objectively present (*vorhanden*) in an existential sense i.e. what is influential concerning our being towards death. Care emerges here in two different ways. On the one hand, we are in the world (being-in) to the extent that it opens up our Dasein's identity in moving towards death. On the other hand, our being is inseparable from care, i.e. we care about the world as the surroundings of our dying. Only by dying are we alive, i.e. we exist. To care about "them", idle talk and ambiguity, does not mean that we must descend into them. It rather means that in their context we should arise as real; the background of our identity should be bland enough in order that existential forms

stand out against it. However, this means not only the need to resist them but also the peculiarity of our being's constitution; we exist by standing out against our surroundings which we care about, which we thereby change. We are alive so long as we care about the surroundings of our dying as we seek to become ourselves. The resolve to die has nothing to do with suicide. The latter, in fact, appeals to the abortion of one's becoming, i.e. to the careless approach both to one's own dying and to the birth of one's surroundings. God is real inasmuch as he is at hand (*zuhanden*) as we become ourselves. Carefulness is also an aspect of thrownness (being in the world). Care is also to be analysed as a function of marginality since we care about the boundary of our being. We can say more by referring to what has been said previously: attunement to one's being's boundary allows one to care about the whole world; this is nothing else than being-in. A thing-at-hand (*Zuhandene*) is at hand (*zuhanden*) so long as it remains unobtainable as it opens up its existential possibilities. Understanding is a certain kind of obtaining. Nevertheless, ultimate understanding is impossible while being in world one cares about with open possibilities.

Question 37 is about the existentials of angst (*Angst*) and fear (*Furcht*). Besides these two concepts, we have their derivatives: alarm (*Grauen*), horror (*Erschrecken*), fearing (*Fürchten*), being afraid of oneself (*Sichfürchten*), fearfulness (*Furchsamkeit*) and fearlessness (*Furchtlosigkeit*). This landscape of angst with its heights and depths shows what an important role in *Being and Time* is played by things related to angst (and fear). Moreover, this variety of nuances in angst (better yet, of attunements) also plays an important role. Angst is not alone. Angst is taken to be the foundational attunement (in paragraph 40) and is called the exclusive disclosure of Dasein or the possibility of its being. Characteristic of angst is indefiniteness (*Unbestimmtheit*), which arises from a threatening nowhere. Nevertheless, that "nowhere" of angst not only contrasts with Dasein's "here" but also brings it out. That "nowhere" indefinitely threatens Dasein only because it declares a definitive "right here". Besides, that "nowhere" refers to a vicinity, i.e., a region on this side of the world. That is precisely why it is so threatening even though it is nowhere. Angst by way of attunement opens up the world. The great ambiguity of angst is that being an attunement, it opens up the world. Angst is the fundamental existential that opens up the world as such. As well, it impels towards identity (*Selbigkeit*), i.e. by separating Dasein from beings-together. The fundamentality of angst thus should be associated with the indefiniteness (being free (*Freisein*)) of the possibilities it opens up, which matches the indefiniteness of angst's "what". The content of nothingness (and of that "nowhere") is that very indefiniteness which demolishes the peaceful (everyday) being at home of the they. However, nothingness is something more than an existential since it borders (be it in an empty way) with that wholeness which emerges in the very background of nothingness. In other words, nothingness with all its varieties nourishes the

wholeness of the world. Darkness is the margin of light and likewise nothingness is being's border which allows one to "see" the whole. Understanding of wholeness is nourished here by angst's attunement, which cracks open nothingness as the edge of being. Although fear is considered a variety of angst it is associated with falling prey, concealment and uncertainty (*Ungewißheit*). In other words, fear is a nothinglike angst.

Question 38 is devoted to the concept "the Moment" (*Augenblick*) and its relationships with other concepts. Everyday talk creates the circumstances for a moment to arise. The Moment signifies a break, a turn or a change upon comparison with the everyday "here": resolute Dasein in the Moment opens itself up to its situation by projecting itself for authentic being. Consequently, the Moment is associated with a sudden surge towards one's resolutely projected Dasein, which thus is opened to opportunities and circumstances which it cares about. It is not the "now", but rather, it "lets us encounter for the first time" (1996: 338). In other words, the Moment is anticipatory (*vorlaufende*) in respect of the present. Making present (*Gegenwärtigen*) is vulgar not because it is everyday but because it lacks the anticipation (*Vorlaufen*) of the Moment, that which would allow the past, present and future to be linked ecstatically by way of a project flowing out of an everyday situation. In other words, the Moment as a break in time is that which guarantees the continuity of time.

Question 39 is on the topic of death. According to Kačerauskas, the question of death is inseparable from the topic of Dasein's life. The angst of death crowns anxious (*ängstlich*) indefiniteness (*ipso facto*, the wholeness) of that, which is everywhere and nowhere. Every project in our life pushes us towards death in several senses. With a new project, we perfect the old one. Additionally, we mortify that part of ourselves which does not fit the new project. Here, we encounter auto-destruction and micro-historicity. We ever dismantle the old (perfected) project for the sake of the new one both by returning to our beginnings and also by opening ourselves up to the future. Together this is a review of our history and a reweaving of its plot lines. Destruction is also the mortifying of tradition in returning to its beginnings and directing elsewhere. For historiography, the attunement of death is not approachable even though it depicts a string of deaths. On the contrary, history looks at death anxiously (*ängstlich*) first of all because our life's plot lines threaten never to connect up. Historicity together with attunement allow a community to be considered as an individual being towards death. In other words, mortality is what forces us (individuals and communities) to move forward. Every outstanding individual seeks to rise above their community and thereby changes it and, indeed, mortifies it. And, conversely, the death of an individual often exalts them, that is, their works, which suddenly come together into a coherent wholeness with their own history from birth to death. It appeals to that which death completes, i.e. to the entire life which emerges in the face of the end. Death as

a factor in Dasein's opening up is a phenomenon. Death itself, more precisely, thrownness into death (together with the other thrownnesses) uncovers itself by attunement to anxiety. Death is an aspect of real life and not, let us say, demise. Dasein lives by dying. Dying is the way Dasein exists towards its end. Heidegger does not limit himself to showing the connection between being towards death and care; he deepens it by analysing the everydayness of Dasein in the context of being towards death.

In Question 40, Vėželis asks for a comment on the idea that “the they” do not allow one to fear death courageously. According to Kačerauskas, courage is not at hand (*zuhanden*) first of all because it infringes on the status quo and the prevailing view. In other words, courage takes aim at very core of “the they”. Courage is that which is related to individual outstandingness even when that becomes a paradigm of social change. It is precisely the conditions of a deficit in authentic being in average everydayness that Dasein's unbypassed (*unüberholbar*) possibility (its ability to be) anxiously emerges, on which an outstanding life is courageously projected. The idle talk of “the they” concerning death is characterized by ambiguity. On the one hand, “the they” cover up dying. On the other hand, the idle talk of “the they” acknowledges its reality. In this context, we also speak of two levels of being, ontological and ontic, which correspond to Dasein's existential and existent levels. These are not some sort of deep and surface levels of being. Rather, ontology acquires depth and content in general by appealing to the ontic level, and the content of existential reasoning is the existent level.

In Question 41, the topic of death is developed further. Although worldliness is inseparable from “theyness”, the possibility of death is precisely what grounds Dasein's separation from “the they” as it projects itself onto its “ownmost potentiality of being” (*eigenst Seinkönnen*). Our individual mortality is what separates us from the “eternal” they-self (*Man-selbst*). Then Kačerauskas analyses the conception of unbypassing (*Unüberholbarkeit*). First, it means that we will not bypass that hour when we are handed over to death. Second, nobody else will bypass us in this matter, i.e. to everyone is fixed their hour of death. Third, it means that Dasein is freed from accidental possibilities that would make it forget death. The fourth sense of unbypassing (*Unüberholbarkeit*) is the discloseness of giving itself up (*Erschließung der Selbstaufgabe*), a novelty which is unbypassed with regards to oneself, which emerges in the face of final possibility. Death, not being obvious, is a factor in the wholeness of being. Death is obvious or even more obvious than the beings we encounter, but not in the sense that we see it, but in the sense that it lets us see all of the beings we encounter and ourselves amongst them. Authentic being is ever shedding its definiteness and looking back at its end. It is impossible without worldliness (theyness) and likewise without it seeing its end, which also opens up the wholeness of the world and Dasein within it. Freedom towards

death, which opens up the wholeness of authentic being, emerges in the substrate of ontic being, which interlays with the environment of “the they”.

Question 42 discusses Heidegger’s conception of freedom. Heidegger speaks about freedom and liberation in two ways: on the one hand, on the formal level by speaking about the liberation of the horizon of the analytics of Dasein; on the other hand, on the ontological level by reasoning about Dasein’s freedom, which does not necessarily emerge in the context of death. The expression „free-floating” (*freischwebende*) exemplifies the first case. The second case splits into two subtopics: positive and negative. The negative subtopic does not mean that freedom is negated somehow. It means only that we speak about it in the sense of “independent” or “unbound”. However, usually in this context negation is used especially in noting Dasein’s worldly dependencies and associations. The concepts of *Freigeben* (making-free), *Freigabe*, and *Befreiung* (the latter two have been translated¹ as freeing) are used. Freeing as *Freigabe* refers not to “freedom” from worldliness but, rather, to the connections between circumspection and calculation (*Rechnen*) in the world. Similar to freeing as *Freigabe* is making-free, which is related to „making space“. Freeing as *Befreiung* is also mentioned with regards to space. A being is freed (*befreit*) to the extent that it is tied with innerworldly (*innerweltlich*) ties. The secret of freedom is the absence of any way to remain free (*Freibleiben*) from the world. Figure 9 shows the meanings of the concept of “freedom” in *Being and Time*. *Being and Time* deals with freedom as formal (logical) as well as ontological, and as positive as well as negative. This variety leads to certain conceptual hybrids and concoctions, among which the possibilities of “freedom” open up. In general, freedom is associated with Dasein’s possibilities, both authentic and inauthentic.

Question 43 analyses understanding, which is inseparable from temporal being in the world. First of all, understanding is the understanding (*Verständnis*) of a thing-at-hand. In this respect, a thing (*Ding*), a thing-at-hand (*Zuhandene*) and a work (*Werk*) are inseparable; they must be understood with regard to each other. Dasein’s thingliness means also a circumspect understanding, which is inseparable from attunement. It is together the understanding of being in the world. In other words, it is the understanding that Dasein’s possibilities open up in the world, even if, and especially if, it is the world of “the they”. This Question also deals with the end of philosophy. Only philosophy towards the end allows one to speak about its possibilities. Signs of the end of philosophy are not simply the specialization of the sciences with ever more regions ceded to particular sciences. A sign of it is also the decomposition and even reproduction of philosophy itself, and even that the word “philosophy” has come to be especially widely used in everyday speech. The disappearance of the limits of philosophy signifies its

¹ By J. Stambough.

dissolution in the sum of knowledge of “the they”. Contemplating the end of philosophy lets one survey its entirety and identify its turning points. This topic, however, is not from *Being and Time* but from Heidegger’s later works.

Question 44 explores the ethical problematics of *Being and Time*. Vėželis appeals to Emmanuel Levinas, who criticizes Heidegger for giving priority to ontology over ethics. According to Kačerauskas, ontology having priority simply means that other philosophical problems, for example, ethical and aesthetic problems, follow from Dasein’s immanence in this world. Indeed, the ideas of *Being and Time* suppose that good and evil should be sought for in the same place as Dasein. Ethical problematics emerge from considering the context of being with Others in the world. Furthermore, Heidegger’s phenomenological approach is also the prophylaxis of any sort of hypostatizing. Finally, the region of power of “the they” is precisely what Heidegger tries to overcome in asserting that theyness is an aspect of worldliness. Every ontological question is to be analysed in a hermeneutic circle, returning to it in an ever broader context.

In Question 45, the discussants return to the distinction between historicity and historiography. Here again we encounter ontology’s priority but this also illustrates the differentiation in ontological questions rather than their uniformity. Every ontological question should be analysed in a hermeneutic circle, returning to it in an ever broader context. First, any sort of ontological distinction makes for a certain hermeneutic circle when, say, history is analysed from the perspective of historiography and vice versa. Second, both history and historiography (if we consider this example) should be analysed bearing in mind the origin of their being, which they are akin to. Third, we can speak about historicity and historiography by appealing to the question of temporality.

Question 46 further develops the problematics of time. Vėželis mentions that the problem of time is a pseudo-problem and that is relevant to the purported failure of Heidegger’s project. According to Kačerauskas, Heidegger raised the conception of existential time, which is inseparable from anxious (*ängstlich*) attunement to being towards death, which is not linguistic. Language (and speaking) with its ambiguities and idle talk are analysed in *Being and Time* with regard to the context of Dasein’s temporal (and worldly) being towards death but not conversely. Heidegger’s “negligence” in leaving the second part of *Being and Time* unwritten should be explained in terms of his interests branching out or even narrowing, but not in terms of any disappointment with *Being and Time*’s ideas. Besides, this cannot be divorced from changes in Heidegger’s own social role.

Question 47 analyses problems of translation. Ethical problematics are also analysed once again. Ethics as a custom and as a way of social being appeals to the margins of both our social life and our sense of self where they impinge on each other. With regards to this, unethical is that which knows no limit, which includes both an unrestrained social life and a towering sense of self. Ethics deals with the

question of the margins of the region of being or with a map of ontological regions. As a result, ontology here is reasoned out by way of its ethical sides. In the case of translation, we face the centre (the original) and a region (a translation) which are measured by way of each other. The criterion of the original's authenticity is its need to be translated. Despite its mortality, a translation contributes to the dynamism of the language into which we translate.

Question 48 deals with Tomas Sodeika's idea which notes the multitude of parasitic texts which feed on Heidegger. According to Kačerauskas, the biggest problem is not the multitude of parasitic texts but rather, why do certain researchers treat the texts of other researchers as parasitic? Their behavior can be linked to their dependence on competing schools, both in the narrow sense of institutions and the broad sense of worldviews. Scientific ethics points to the fact that authentic research emerges despite the humiliation of a researcher or even thanks to this humiliation.

Question 49 deals with the topics of philosophy's ruins and the "cleaning" of tradition. Greek philosophy in *Being and Time* is a subject which opens up with regard to the context of existential ontology which is opened up thereby. Heidegger gave rise to the wave of interest in Greek philosophy simply because of the fact that he destroyed that tradition in developing his own approach of existential ontology. If we want to master the Greek or any other tradition, we should bring it into our life and our philosophizing. If we fail to do so, i.e. if this tradition no longer yields new impulses, then we truly live enclosed among its ruins.

In the final Question 50, the discussants come back to the issue of time. According to Kačerauskas, the repeated emergence of the issue of time is symptomatic since repetitions and returns are essential in understanding time. Although time signifies irreversible movement forwards, we do not understand it except by looking back.