

Sūtras, and the *pramāṇas*, the *prameyas*, and the nature of *nyāya* (argument). The next set is from *adhyāya* 2, *āhnika* 1 and concerns the validity of the *pramāṇas*, specifically, *pratyakṣa* (perception).

The second selection is from the *Nyāya-vārttika* of Uddyotakara (seventh century C.E.). The *Nyāya-vārttika* is a commentary on Vātsyāyana's *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, which is itself a commentary on the *Nyāya Sūtras*. This selection concerns arguments against the Yogācāra school of Buddhism, which puts forth an idealist position that all that is perceived is a projection of the mind and, moreover, that there are no objects external to the mind.

FROM GAUTAMA'S NYĀYA SŪTRAS

Book 1, Chapter 1

1. "Supreme felicity" is attained by the knowledge about the true nature of the sixteen categories: means of right knowledge (*pramāṇa*), object of right knowledge (*prameya*), doubt (*saṁśaya*), purpose (*prayojana*), familiar instance (*dṛṣṭānta*), established tenet (*siddhānta*), members (*avayava*), confutation (*tarka*), ascertainment (*nirṇaya*), discussion (*vāda*), wrangling (*jalpa*), cavil (*vitandā*), fallacy (*hetvābhāsa*), quibble (*chala*), futility (*jāti*), and occasion for rebuke (*nigrahasthāna*).

"Knowledge about the true nature of the sixteen categories" means true knowledge by the "enunciation," "definition," and "critical examination" of the categories. Book 1 (of the *Nyāya Sūtra*) treats of "enunciation" and "definition," while the remaining four books are reserved for "critical examination." The attainment of supreme felicity is preceded by the knowledge of four things: (1) that which is fit to be abandoned (viz. pain); (2) that which produces what is fit to be abandoned (viz. misapprehension, etc.); (3) complete destruction of what is fit to be abandoned; and (4) the means of destroying what is fit to be abandoned (viz. true knowledge).

2. Pain, birth, activity, faults, and misapprehension—on the successive annihilation of these in the reverse order, there follows *release*.

Misapprehension, faults, activity, birth, and pain—these in their uninterrupted course constitute the "world." Release, which consists in the soul's getting rid of the world, is the condition of supreme felicity marked by perfect tranquility and not tainted by any defilement. A person, by the true knowledge of the sixteen categories, is able to remove his misapprehension. When this is done, his faults (viz. affection, aversion, and stupidity) disappear. He is then no longer subject to any

activity and is consequently freed from transmigration and pains. This is the way in which his release is effected and supreme felicity secured.

3. Perception, inference, comparison, and word (verbal testimony)—these are the *means of right knowledge*.

[The Cārvākas admit only one means of right knowledge, viz. perception (*pratyakṣa*); the Vaiśeṣikas and Buddhas admit two, viz. perception and inference (*anumāna*); the Sāṃkhyas admit three, viz. perception, inference, and verbal testimony (*āgama* or *śabda*); while the Naiyāyikas, whose fundamental work is the *Nyāya Sūtra*, admit four, viz. perception, inference, verbal testimony, and comparison (*upamāna*). The Prābhākaras admit a fifth means of right knowledge called presumption (*arthāpatti*), the Bhāṭṭas and Vedāntins admit a sixth, viz. nonexistence (*abhāva*), and the Purāṇikas recognize a seventh and eight means of right knowledge, named probability (*sambhava*) and rumor (*aitihya*).]

4. *Perception* is that knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense with its object, and which is determinate, unnameable, and nonerratic.

Determinate: This epithet distinguishes perception from indeterminate knowledge; as, for instance, a man looking from a distance cannot ascertain whether there is smoke or dust.

Unnameable: Signifies that the knowledge of a thing derived through perception has no connection with the name that the thing bears.

Nonerratic: In summer the sun's rays coming in contact with earthly heat quiver and appear to the eyes of men as water. The knowledge of water derived in this way is not perception. To eliminate such cases the epithet "nonerratic" has been used.

[This aphorism may also be translated as follows: *Perception* is knowledge and which arises from the contact of a sense with its object and which is nonerratic, being either indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*, as "this is something") or determinate (*savikalpaka*, as "this is a Brāhmaṇa").]

5. *Inference* is knowledge that is preceded by perception, and is of three kinds, viz. a priori, a posteriori, and "commonly seen."

A priori is the knowledge of effect derived from the perception of its cause; e.g., one seeing clouds infers that there will be rain.

A posteriori is the knowledge of cause derived from the perception of its effects, e.g., one seeing a river swollen infers that there was rain.

"*Commonly seen*" is the knowledge of one thing derived from the perception of another thing with which it is commonly seen, e.g., one seeing a beast possessing horns, infers that it possesses also a tail, or one seeing smoke on a hill infers that there is fire on it.

6. *Comparison* is the knowledge of a thing through its similarity to another thing previously well known.

A man, hearing from a forester that a *bos gavaeus* is like a cow, resorts to a forest where he sees an animal like a cow. Having recollected what he heard he institutes a comparison, by which he arrives at the conviction that the animal he sees is *bos gavaeus*: This is knowledge derived through comparison. Some hold that comparison is not a separate means of knowledge, for when one notices the likeness of a cow in a strange animal one really performs an act of perception. In reply, it is urged that we cannot deny comparison as a separate means of knowledge, for how does otherwise the name *bos gavaeus* signify the general notion of the animal called *bos gavaeus*? That the name *bos gavaeus* signifies one and all members of the *bos gavaeus* class is not a result of perception, but the consequence of a distinct knowledge, called comparison.

7. *Word (verbal testimony)* is the instructive assertion of a reliable person.

A reliable person is one—maybe a *ṛṣi*, *ārya*, or *mleccha*—who was an expert in a certain matter and is willing to communicate his experiences of it.

[Suppose a young man coming to the side of a river cannot ascertain whether the river is fordable or not, and immediately an old experienced man of the locality, who has no enmity against him, comes and tells him that the river is easily fordable: the word of the old man is to be accepted as a means of right knowledge called “verbal testimony”.]

8. It is of two kinds, viz. that which refers to *matter which is seen*, and that which refers to *matter which is not seen*.

The first kind involves matter that can be actually verified. Though we are incapable of verifying the matter involved in the second kind, we can somehow ascertain it by means of inference.

[*Matter which is seen*, e.g., a physician’s assertion that physical strength is gained by taking butter. *Matter which is not seen*, e.g., a religious teacher’s assertion that one conquers heaven by performing horse-sacrifices.]

9. Soul, body, senses, objects of sense, intellect, mind, activity, fault, transmigration, fruit, pain, and release—are the *objects of right knowledge*.

The objects of right knowledge are also enumerated as substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, intimate relation, [and nonexistence, which are the technicalities of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.]

10. Desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain, and intelligence are the marks of the soul.

[These abide in the soul, or rather are the qualities of the substance called soul.]

11. *Body* is the site of gesture, senses, and sentiments.

Body is the site of *gesture*, inasmuch as it strives to reach what is desirable and to avoid what is hateful. It is also the site of *senses*, for the latter act well or ill, according as the former is in good or bad order. *Sentiments* that comprise pleasure and pain are also located in the body that experiences them.

12. Nose, tongue, eye, skin, and ear are the senses produced from elements.

None is of the same nature as earth, tongue as water, eye as light, skin as air, and ear as ether.

13. Earth, water, light, air, and ether—these are the *elements*.

14. Smell, taste, color, touch, and sound are *objects of the senses* and qualities of the earth, etc.

Smell is the object of nose and the prominent quality of earth, taste is the object of tongue and quality of water, color is the object of eye and quality of fire, touch is the object of skin and quality of air, and sound is the object of ear and quality of ether.

15. *Intellect*, apprehension, and knowledge—these are not different from one another.

16. The mark of the *mind* is that there do not arise (in the soul) more acts of knowledge than one at a time.

It is impossible to perceive two things simultaneously. Perception does not arise merely from the contact of a sense-organ with its object, but it requires also a conjunction of the mind. Now, the mind, which is an atomic substance, cannot be conjoined with more than one sense-organ at a time, hence there cannot occur more acts of perception than one at one time.

17. *Activity* is that which makes the voice, mind, and body begin their action.

There are three kinds of action, viz. *vocal*, *mental*, and *bodily*, each of which may be subdivided as good or bad.

Bodily actions that are *bad* are: (1) killing, (2) stealing, and (3) committing adultery.

Bodily actions that are *good* are: (1) giving, (2) protecting, and (3) serving.

Vocal actions that are *bad* are: (1) telling a lie, (2) using harsh language, (3) slandering, and (4) indulging in frivolous talk.

Vocal actions that are *good* are: (1) speaking the truth, (2) speaking what is useful, (3) speaking what is pleasant, and (4) reading sacred books.

Mental actions that are *bad* are: (1) malice, (2) covetousness, and (3) skepticism.

Mental actions that are *good* are: (1) compassion, (2) refraining from covetousness, and (3) devotion.

18. *Faults* have the characteristic of causing activity.

The faults are affection, aversion, and stupidity.

19. *Transmigration* means rebirths.

Transmigration is the series of births and deaths. Birth is the connection of soul with body, sense-organs, mind, intellect, and sentiments, while death is the soul's separation from them.

20. *Fruit* is the thing produced by activity and faults.

Fruit consists in the enjoyment of pleasure or suffering of pain. All activity and faults end in producing pleasure, which is acceptable, and pain, which is fit only to be avoided.

21. *Pain* has the characteristic of causing uneasiness.

Pain is affliction that everyone desires to avoid. The aphorism may also be translated as follows: "Pain is the mark of hindrance to the soul."

22. *Release* is the absolute deliverance from pain.

A soul that is no longer subject to transmigration is freed from all pains. Transmigration, which consists in the soul's leaving one body and taking another, is the cause of its ongoing pleasure and pain. The soul attains release as soon as there is an end of the body, and, consequently, of pleasure and pain. Those are mistaken who maintain that release enables the soul not only to get rid of all pains, but also to attain eternal pleasure, for pleasure is as impermanent as pain and the body.

23. *Doubt*, which is a conflicting judgment about the precise character of an object, arises from the recognition of properties common to many objects, or of properties not common to any of the objects, from conflicting testimony, and from irregularity of perception and nonperception.

Doubt is of five kinds, according as it arises from: (1) *recognition of common properties*, e.g., seeing in the twilight a tall object we cannot decide whether it is a man or a post, for the property of tallness belongs to both; (2) *recognition of properties not common*, e.g., hearing a sound, one questions whether it is eternal or not, for the property of soundness abides neither in man, beast, etc., which are noneternal, nor in atoms, which are eternal; (3) *conflicting testimony*, e.g., merely by study one cannot decide whether the soul exists, for one system of philosophy affirms that it does, while another system states that it does not; (4) *irregularity of perception*, e.g., we perceive water in the tank, where it really exists, but water appears also to exist in the mirage, where it really does not exist—a question arises whether water is perceived only when it actually exists, or even when it does not exist; (5) *irregularity of nonperception*, e.g., we do not perceive water in the radish where it really exists, and also on dry land where it does not exist—a question arises whether water is not perceived only when it does not exist, or also when it does exist.

24. *Purpose* is that with an eye to which one proceeds to act.

Purpose refers to the thing which one endeavors to attain or avoid.

[A man collects fuel for the purpose of cooking his food.]

25. A *familiar instance* is the thing about which an ordinary man and an expert entertain the same opinion.

[With regard to the general proposition "wherever there is smoke there is fire," the familiar instance is a kitchen in which fire and smoke abide together, to the satisfaction of an ordinary man as well as an acute investigator.]

26. An *established tenet* is a dogma resting on the authority of a certain school, hypothesis, or implication.

27. The tenet is of four kinds owing to the distinction between a dogma of all the schools, a dogma peculiar to some school, a hypothetical dogma, and an implied dogma.

28. A *dogma of all the schools* is a tenet that is not opposed by any school and is claimed by at least one school.

The five elements (viz. earth, water, light, air, and ether), the five objects of sense (viz. smell, taste, color, touch, and sound), etc., are tenets that are accepted by all the schools.

29. A *dogma peculiar to some schools* is a tenet that is accepted by similar schools, but rejected by opposite schools.

"A thing cannot come into existence out of nothing"—this is a peculiar dogma of the Sāṃkhya. [The eternity of sound is a peculiar dogma of the Mīmāṃsaka.]

30. An *hypothetical dogma* is a tenet that, if accepted, leads to the acceptance of another tenet.

"There is a soul apart from the senses, because it can recognize one and the same object by seeing and touching." If you accept this tenet you must also have accepted the following: (1) that the senses are more than one, (2) that each of the senses has its particular object, (3) that the soul derives its knowledge through the channels of the senses, (4) that a substance that is distinct from its qualities is the abode of them, etc.

31. An *implied dogma* is a tenet that is not explicitly declared as such, but that follows from the examination of particulars concerning it.

The discussion of whether sound is eternal or noneternal presupposes that it is a substance. "That sound is a substance" is here an implied dogma. [The mind has nowhere been stated in the Nyāya Sūtra to be a sense-organ, but it follows from the particulars examined concerning it that it is so.]

32. The *members* (of a syllogism) are preposition, reason, example, application, and conclusion.

[1. *Proposition*: This hill is fiery,

2. *Reason*: Because it is smoky,

3. *Example*: Whatever is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen,

4. *Application*: So is this hill (smoky),

5. *Conclusion*: Therefore this hill is fiery.]

Some lay down five more members as follows:

1a. *Inquiry as to the proposition (jijñāsā)*: Is this hill fiery in all its parts, or in a particular part?

2a. *Questioning the reason (saṁśaya)*: That which you call smoke may be nothing but vapor.

3a. *Capacity of the example to warrant the conclusion (śakyaprāpti)*: Is it true that smoke is always a concomitant of fire? In a kitchen there are of course both smoke and fire, but in a red-hot iron-ball there is no smoke.

4a. *Purpose for drawing the conclusion (prayojana)*: Purpose consists in the determination of the true conditions of the hill, in order to ascertain whether it is such that one can approach it, or such that one should avoid it, or such that one should maintain an attitude of indifference towards it.

4b. *Dispelling all questions (saṁśayavyudāsa)*: It is beyond all question that the hill is smoky, and that smoke is an invariable-concomitant of fire.

33. A *proposition* is the declaration of what is to be established.

Sound is noneternal—this is a proposition.

34. The *reason* is the means for establishing what is to be established through the *homogeneous* or affirmative character of the example.

Proposition: Sound is noneternal,

Reason: Because it is produced,

Example (homogeneous): Whatever is produced is noneternal, as a pot.

The example "pot" possesses the same character as is implied in the reason, viz. "being produced," inasmuch as both are noneternal.

35. Likewise through *heterogeneous* or *negative* character.

Proposition: Sound is noneternal,

Reason: Because it is produced,

Example (heterogeneous): Whatever is not noneternal is not produced, as the soul.

The example "soul" possesses a character heterogeneous to that which is implied in the reason, viz. "being produced," inasmuch as one is eternal and the other noneternal.

36. A *homogeneous* (or *affirmative*) *example* is a familiar instance that is known to possess the property to be established, and that implies that this property is invariably contained in the reason given.

Proposition: Sound is noneternal,

Reason: Because it is produced,

Homogeneous example: Whatever is produced is noneternal, as a pot.

Here "pot" is a familiar instance that possesses the property of noneternality and implies that whatever is "produced" is attended by the same property (non-eternality).

37. A *heterogeneous* (or *negative*) *example* is a familiar instance that is known to be devoid of the property to be established and that implies that the absence of this property is invariably rejected in the reason given.

Proposition: Sound is noneternal,

Reason: Because it is produced,

Heterogeneous example: Whatever is not noneternal is not produced, as the soul.

Here the "soul" is a familiar instance that is known to be devoid of the property of noneternality and implies that if anything were produced, it would necessarily be deprived of the quality of eternality, i.e., "being produced" and "eternal" are incompatible epithets.

38. *Application* is a winding up, with reference to the example, of what is to be established as being so or not so.

Application is of two kinds: (1) *affirmative* and (2) *negative*. The affirmative application, which is expressed by the word "so," occurs when the example is of an affirmative character. The negative, which is expressed by the phrase "not so," occurs when the example is of a negative character.

Proposition: Sound is noneternal,

Reason: Because it is produced,

Example: Whatever is produced is noneternal, as a pot,

Affirmative application: So is sound (produced),

Conclusion: Therefore sound is noneternal.

Or:

Proposition: Sound is noneternal,

Reason: Because it is produced,

Example: Whatever is eternal is not produced, as the soul,

Negative application: Sound is not so (i.e., sound is not not-produced),

Conclusion: Therefore sound is not eternal.

39. *Conclusion* is the restating of the proposition, after the reason has been mentioned.

Conclusion is the confirmation of the proposition, after the reason and the example have been mentioned.

Proposition: Sound is noneternal,

Reason: Because it is produced,

Example: Whatever is produced is noneternal, as a pot,

Application: So is sound (produced).

Conclusion: Therefore sound is noneternal.

40. *Confutation*, which is carried on for ascertaining the real character of a thing of which the character is not known, is reasoning

that reveals the character by showing the absurdity of all contrary characters.

Is the soul eternal or noneternal? Here the real character of the soul, viz. whether it is eternal or non-eternal, is not known. In ascertaining the character, we reason as follows: if the soul were noneternal, it would be impossible for it to enjoy the fruits of its own actions, to undergo transmigration, and to attain final release. But such a conclusion is absurd: such possibilities are known to belong to the soul—therefore, we must admit that the soul is eternal.

41. *Ascertainment* is the removal of doubt, and the determination of a question, by hearing two opposite sides.

A person wavers and doubts if certain statements are advanced to him by one of two parties, but opposed by the other party. His doubt is not removed until by the application of reason he can vindicate either of the parties. The process by which the vindication is effected is called *ascertainment*. Ascertainment is not, however, in all cases preceded by doubt; for instance, in the case of perception things are ascertained directly. So also we ascertain things directly by the authority of scriptures or through discussion. But in the case of investigation, doubt must precede ascertainment.

Book 1, Chapter 2

42. *Discussion* is the adoption of one of two opposing sides. What is adopted is analyzed in the form of five members, and defended by the aid of any of the means of right knowledge, while its opposite is assailed by confutation, without deviation from the established tenets.

[A *dialogue* or *disputation* (*kathā*) is the adoption of a side by a disputant and its opposite by his opponent. It is of three kinds: *discussion*, which aims at ascertaining the truth, *wrangling*, which aims at gaining victory, and *cavil*, which aims at finding mere faults. A *discutient* is one who engages himself in a disputation as a means of seeking the truth.]

An instance of discussion is given below:

Discutient: There is soul.

Opponent: There is no soul.

Discutient: Soul is existent (*proposition*). Because it is an abode of consciousness (*reason*). Whatever is not existent, is not an abode of consciousness, as a hare's horn (*negative example*). Soul is not so, that is, soul is an abode of consciousness (*negative application*). Therefore soul is existent (*conclusion*).

Opponent: Soul is nonexistent (*proposition*). Because, etc., . . .

Discutient: The scripture that is a verbal testimony declares the existence of soul.

Opponent: . . .

Discutient: If there were no soul, it would not be possible to apprehend one and the same object, through sight and touch.

Opponent: . . .

Discutient: The doctrine of soul harmonizes well with the various tenets which we hold, viz. that there are eternal things, that everybody enjoys pleasure or suffers pain, according to his own actions, etc. Therefore, there is soul.

[The discussion will be considerably lengthened if the opponent happens to be a Buddhist, who does not admit the authority of scripture and holds that there are no eternal things, etc.]

43. *Wrangling*, which aims at gaining victory, is the defense or attack of a proposition in the manner aforesaid, by quibbles, futilities, and other processes that deserve rebuke.

A *wrangler* is one who, engaged in a disputation, aims only at victory, being indifferent whether the arguments he employs support his own contention or that of his opponent, provided that he can make out a pretext for bragging that he has taken an active part in the disputation.

44. *Cavil* is a kind of wrangling that consists in mere attacks on the opposite side.

A *caviller* does not endeavor to establish anything, but confines himself to mere carping at the arguments of his opponent.

45. *Fallacies of a reason* are the erratic, the contradictory, the equal to the question, the unproved, and the mistimed.

46. The *erratic* is a reason that leads to more conclusions than one.

An instance of the *erratic* reason is given below:

Proposition: Sound is eternal,

Erratic reason: Because it is intangible,

Example: Whatever is intangible is eternal, as atoms,

Application: So is sound (intangible),

Conclusion: Therefore sound is eternal.

Again:

Proposition: Sound is noneternal,

Erratic reason: Because it is intangible,

Example: Whatever is intangible is noneternal, as intellect,

Application: So is sound (intangible).

Conclusion: Therefore sound is noneternal.

Here from the reason there have been drawn two opposite conclusions: that sound is eternal, and that sound is noneternal. The reason or middle term is erratic when it is not pervaded by the major term, that is, when there is no