

20. If the party admits the flaw in his own thesis, and then urges the same in that of the opponent,—this is a case of [“the admission of an opinion”]. [Jha]

21. “Overlooking the censurable” consists in not rebuking a person who deserves rebuke.

22. “Censuring the non-censurable” consists in rebuking a person who does not deserve rebuke.

23. A person who, after accepting a tenet, departs from it in the course of his disputation, is guilty of “deviating from a tenet.”

24. “The fallacies of reason” already explained<sup>1</sup> do also furnish occasions for rebuke.

## B. NYĀYA KUSUMĀNĀJALI

Now although with regard to that Being whom all men alike worship, whichever of the (four well-known) ends of man<sup>2</sup> they may desire,—(thus the followers of the Upaniṣads [worship it] as the very knower,—the disciples of Kapila as the perfect first Wise,—those of Patañjali as Him who, untouched by pain, action, fruit or desert, having assumed a body in order to create, revealed the tradition of the Veda and is gracious to all living beings,—the Mahāpāśupatas<sup>3</sup> as the Independent one, undefiled by vaidic [Vedic] or secular violations,—the Śaivas as Śiva,—the Vaiṣṇavas<sup>4</sup> as Puruṣottama,—the followers of the Purāṇas<sup>5</sup> as the great Father (Brahmā),—the Ceremonialists as the Soul of the sacrifice,—the Saugatas<sup>6</sup> as the Omniscient,—the Jainas as the Unobstructed,—the Mīmāṃsakas as Him who is pointed out as to be worshipped,—the Cārvākas as Him who is established by the conventions of the world,—the followers of the Nyāya as Him who is all that is said worthy of Him,—why farther detail? whom even the artizans themselves worship as the great artizan, Viśvakarman)—although, I say, with regard to that Being, the adorable Śiva, whom all recognise throughout the world as universally acknowledged like castes, families, family invocations of Agni, schools, social customs, &c., how can there arise any doubt? and what then is there to be ascertained? (Introductory commentary, 1.3.)

1.3. Still this logical investigation may be well called the contemplation of God, and this is really worship when it follows the hearing of the *śruti* ([revealed scriptures]).<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See above, *sūtras* 1.ii.4–9.

<sup>2</sup> That is, righteousness (*dharma*), wealth (*artha*), pleasure (*kāma*), and liberation (*mokṣa*).

<sup>3</sup> Members of an ancient religious sect.

<sup>4</sup> Followers of Viṣṇu.

<sup>5</sup> Ancient legendary texts.

<sup>6</sup> Members of an ancient religious sect.

<sup>7</sup> Brackets within parentheses indicate additions made by the editors. Brackets alone are those of the translator.

Therefore that adorable one who hath been often heard mentioned in the *śruti*, *smṛti* ([traditional texts]), narrative poems, Purāṇas, &c., must now be contemplated, according to such a *śruti* as "He is to be heard and to be contemplated," and such a *smṛti* as "by the Veda, inference and the delight of continued meditation,—in this threefold manner producing knowledge, a man obtains the highest concentration." Now there is, in short, a fivefold opposition to our theory,—based, first, on the non-existence of any supernatural cause of another world (as *adr̥ṣṭa*, the merit and demerit of our actions);<sup>1</sup>—or secondly, on the possibility of our putting in action certain causes of another world (as sacrifices),<sup>2</sup> even if God be allowed to be non-existent;—or thirdly, on the existence of proofs which show the non-existence of God;—or fourthly, on the opinion that, even if God does exist, he cannot be a cause of true knowledge to us;—or fifthly, on the absence of any argument to prove his existence.<sup>3</sup>

1.4 From dependence,—from eternity,—from diversity,—from universal practice,—and from the apportionment to each individual self,—mundane enjoyment implies a supernatural cause [i.e., "desert"].

Our proposition is that there exists a supernatural cause of another world, i.e., a cause beyond the reach of the senses. (a) First of all, then, to establish the class of causes in general, he says, "from dependence." Dependence means here that the effect is occasional. All effects must have a cause since they are occasional, like the gratification produced by food; [otherwise, if they did not depend on a cause, they could be found anywhere and always], (b) ([Objection:]) "But if the cause of a jar, &c. were eternal, would it not follow that the jar, &c. would also be eternal, and therefore we must assume the jar's cause to be itself only occasional, and therefore the perpetual series of causes must be all occasional, each dependent on its previous cause?" To meet this objection of a *regressus ad infinitum*, he says, "from the eternity [of the succession of cause and effect]," like the continued series of seed and shoot,—the meaning being that a *regressus ad infinitum* ceases to be a fault, if, like this one alleged in our illustration, it can be proved by the evidence of our senses. (c) ([Objection:]) "But [if you require a cause], why not say [with the Vedāntin] that *Brahma* ([*Brahman*]) alone is the cause, or [with the Sāṃkhya] Nature in the form of various individual intellects"? To meet this, he says, "from the diversity [of effects, as heaven, hell, &c.]"—as the effects imply a diversity of causes, from their being diverse as effects. (d) ([Objection:]) "But why not accept a visible cause as sacrifices, &c.—why have recourse to an invisible desert (*adr̥ṣṭa*)?" To meet this, he adds, "from the universal

<sup>1</sup> That is, there is no supernatural cause of rewards and punishments, corresponding to the merits and demerits of our actions, a cause that is called "*adr̥ṣṭa*" (an unseen force) in some systems.

<sup>2</sup> That is, sacrificial offerings may bring about rewards and punishments.

<sup>3</sup> The five objections serve as the topics of the five chapters of the *Kusumāñjali*. All of the objections are considered in the text in full detail. In the selections given here, only the main statements in reply to the objections are given.

practice," i.e., from the fact that all men, desiring fruit in another world, do engage in sacrifices, &c. It is only the conviction that they do produce heaven, &c. as their fruit, which makes men engage in sacrifices, &c.; and these [passing away when the action is over] cannot produce this fruit unless by means of some influence which continues to act after the rite is over,—and hence is this invisible influence, called merit or demerit, established. (e) ([Objection:]) "But why not say that this desert does not reside in the same subject as the enjoyment [i.e., the individual self], but produces the enjoyment by abiding in the thing enjoyed?" He replies, "from the apportionment to each self." Since the enjoyment resides in each word severally, we should be unwarranted to attribute its production to a desert residing elsewhere.

The second objection was that there is no proof of God, since the means of attaining paradise can be practised independently of any such being. That is to say "sacrifices, which are the instruments of obtaining paradise, can be performed even without a God, since it is proved in the Veda that sacrifices are a means of obtaining heaven, and the Veda possesses authority from its eternity and freedom from defects, and we can also gather its authority from its having been accepted by great saints [as Manu and others] and therefore you cannot establish the existence of God on the ground that he is the author of the Veda; or we may suppose that the Veda was made by sages like Kapila and others, who gained omniscience by their preeminence in concentrated devotion."—He replies, (Introductory commentary, II.1.)

II.1. Since right knowledge requires an external source, since creation and destruction take place, and since none other than He can be relied on,—there is no other way open.

The right knowledge caused by testimony is one which is produced by a quality in the speaker, viz., his knowledge of the exact meaning of the words used; hence the existence of God is proved, as he must be the subject of such a quality in the case of the Veda. ([Objection:]) "But may we not allow that such a quality as the knowledge of the exact meaning of the words used is required in the case of an effect which implies an agent; but in the case of the uncreated Veda it is its freedom from defects which produces its authoritativeness, and we can know its authoritativeness from its having been accepted by great saints?" He replies, "because creation and destruction take place." After a mundane destruction, when the former Veda is destroyed, how can the subsequent Veda possess authority, since there will then be no possibility of its having been accepted by great saints? . . . ([Objection:]) "Well, then, let us say that at the beginning of a creation Kapila and others were its authors, who had acquired omniscience by the power of merit gained by the practice of concentrated devotion in the former aeon." He replies, "none other than He can be relied on." If you mean by omniscient beings, those endowed with the various superhuman faculties of assuming infinitesimal size, &c. and

capable of creating everything, then we reply that the law of parsimony bids us assume only one such, namely Him, the adorable Lord. There can be no confidence in a non-eternal and non-omniscient being, and hence it follows that according to the system which rejects God, the tradition of the Veda is simultaneously overthrown,—“there is no other way open.”

The third objection was that there were positive arguments to prove God’s non-existence. “Just as we infer a jar’s absence in a given space of ground [i.e., its non-existence there,] so we infer God’s non-existence from His not being perceived. If you reply that ‘the Supreme Being is not a legitimate object of perception, and, therefore, since we cannot here have a valid non-perception, we cannot assume His non-existence,’—we retort that in the same way we might prove that a hare’s horns may exist since we have only to maintain that it is not a legitimate object of our perception.” He answers, (Introductory commentary, iii.1.)

iii.1. In an illegitimate object [of perception] how can there be a valid non-perception? and still more, how can you establish your contradiction? How can the hare’s horn be precluded as absurd if it is an illegitimate object? and how can you have an inference without a subject to base it on?

In the case of the Supreme Being who is not a legitimate object, how can there be a valid non-perception? It is only *this* which precludes a thing’s existence; but the absence of perception which obtains in the case of God cannot exert this precluding influence, as otherwise we should equally be forced to deny the existence of ether, merit, demerit, &c. But a horn must be a legitimate object of perception,—how then can your retort contradict our argument? If you say that a hare’s horn is an illegitimate object of perception, then of course its existence is not necessarily precluded,—there is only an absence of proof to establish it; but this cannot be retorted against *us* as the fifth Cluster ([chapter]) will fully show that there are positive arguments to establish God’s existence. ([Objection:]) “But may we not infer God’s non-existence from the absence, in His case, of a body, and also of any assignable motive for action?” He replies,—how can you have an inference where the minor term is itself controverted? while on the other hand the very proof which will establish the existence of the subject (God) is itself sufficient to debar your subsequent inference [that there is no God].

The fourth objection was that even if God did exist, he could not be a cause of right knowledge to us. “God cannot be an authority to us, because he has no right knowledge, as his knowledge lacks the indispensable characteristic of cognizing an object uncognized before; hence he neither possesses right knowledge himself nor can produce it in us, and who would trust the words of a being who cannot be a cause of right knowledge?” He replies, (Introductory commentary, iv.1.)