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I have now found something about the original officers of EK3, Hamann, Eisenbarth, Grauer, Kortkampf, Wolff, Müller, Schäfer and Schmitz . Source: Krieg und Verbrechen, by Timm Richter. Fair excerpt: All of EK3s officers came from the lower middleclass, as young men jobless or had to leave university due to the crisis of the early 30s and joined the Nazis, earning a job in the police at various times following 1933, becoming Polizeikomissaranwärter. Hamann shortly joined the Wehrmacht but in 1938 was sacked because of mistreatment of subordinates. Shortly afterwards he also became a policeman. 6 of these 8, Hamann, Eisenbarth, Grauer, Kortkampf, Wolff and Schäfer, became members of a rather elite circle (ca. 90 men from the whole 3rd Reich) destined for high posts in the future police following university law studies. They were selected bcause being convinced Nazis as well as making a "very good" job. All were aware that the fast career they were making solely rested on them being trustworthy Nazis. And thus they were under a high pressure to "pay back" the trust given to them. They were law students in Berlin when called to Pretzsch were they met Jäger. 130-men strong EK3 consisted of three groups, led by Grauer, Kortkampf and Hamann. When arriving at Kaunas EK3s staff was organized like the RSHA, into 5 departments, all led by the young officers which weeks ago still had been students. For instance Kortkampf and as his subordinate Wolff led the EK3 SD department. Eisenbarth became Stapo leader, his assistent being Hamann. Very soon, in the second week of July, Hamann left to take over the infamous Rollkommando, consisting of 8 to 10 men, of which some formed the "core", other members changing over time. Most Rollkommando members came from Plauen Ortspolizei. Hamann became the key figure in extermiating the Jews of Lithuania as Jäger left him with a lot of freedom, adding to this was that his colleagues left the area by the end of July to follow the rear or the advancing Wehrmacht. 30 men under Kortkampf, including Eisenbarth and Wolff, were sent eastward to "fight Partisans". They returned about 4 weeks later though. Eisenbarth and Wolff took over Anti-Jewish actions out of Vilnius. Most of those killings out of Vilnius were executed by Lithuanian special forces commanded by a SS-Oberscharführer Schweinberger, who also acted as liasion officer between his killer squads of locals to Eisenbarth and Wolff who gave the orders. Eisenbarth left in September due to illness. Now the main responsibility was laid on Wolffs shoulders, who oversaw the murder of ca. 15000 Jews. Meanwhile, the largescale killings commanded by these young officers caused concern in Berlin about the possible psychological consequences distorting the character of men destined to become high leaders. They were called back by the end of October to resume studies. EK3 was unusual among the EKs, with an old Nazi as leader, and particularly motivated and intelligent subordinates, which proved to be highly efficient. Thus young, intelligent police officers ignited the Holocaust in full...


Vokiečių SS (Stahlecker) buvo numatęs žydų išžudymą, jo siekęs... liepos 3-čią: the Wehrmacht is, for the time being, not in a position to dispose of the Jewish manpower still available and fit for work

) Operational Situation Report USSR No. 11 July 3, 1941

Einsatzkommando 2: Location July 3, 1941: Siauliai, NKVD Building.

Siauliai: 35,000 inhabitants (12-15,000 Jews). About 2,000 Jews are still left. The others have fled. The prison is empty. In order to keep the war plants and the plants vital for the population operational, the Wehrmacht is, for the time being, not in a position to dispose of the Jewish manpower still available and fit for work

From Stahlecker's 15 Oct 1941 report on the activities of units under his command (Einsatzgruppe A), including EK 3, posted at: viewtopic.php?p=540402#540402 (a) Similarly, native anti-Semitic forces were included to start pograms against Jews [at Kovno, Lithuania on 25-26 Jun 1941} during the first hours after capture, though this inducement proved to be very difficultFollowing out orders, the Security Police was determined to solve the Jewish question with all possible means and most decisively. But it was desirable that the Security Police should not put in an immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since the extraordinarily harsh measures were apt to stir even German circles..

(b) Action against Jewry. From the beginning it was to be expected that the Jewish problem in the East could not be solved by pogroms alone. In accordance with the basic orders received, however, the cleansing activities of the Security Police had to aim at a complete annihilation of the Jews. Special detachments reinforced by selected units in Lithouania partisan detachments, in Latvia units of the Latvian auxiliary police therefore performed extensive executions both in the towns and in rural areas.

(c) After the carrying out of the first larger executions in Lithouania and Latvia it became soon apparent that an annihilation of the Jews without leaving any traces could not be carried out, at least not at the present moment.

(d) In this connection it may be mentioned that some authorities of the Civil Administration offered resistance, at times even a strong one, against the carrying out of larger executions. This resistance was answered by calling attention to the fact that it was a matter of carrying out basic orders.

(5) More from Dr. Stahlecker, from the post at: viewtopic.php?p=677142#677142 Similarly, within a few hours of our entering the city, local anti-Semitic elements were induced to engage in pogroms against the Jews, despite the extremely difficult conditions. In accordance with orders the security police were bent on solving the Jewish question with extreme firmness using all the ways and means at its disposal. It was thought a good idea for the security police not to be seen to be involved, at least not immediately, in these unusually tough measures, which were also bound to attract attention in German circles. The impression had to be created that the local population itself had taken the first steps of its own accord as a natural reaction to decades of oppression by the Jews and the more recent terror exerted by the Communists.

In view of the fact that operations to extend the field of action were under way and the security police had their hands full, every attempt was made from the outset to ensure that reliable elements in the local population participated in the fight against the pests in their country, that is, the Jews and the Communists. Precautions, which will be described in more detail below, had to be taken when directing the first spontaneous self-cleansing actions that reliable people were engaged in the mopping-up work who could act as a permanent source of assistance to the security police. In order to do this the activist forces had banded together into so-called partisan units in order to engage actively in the struggle against Bolshevism. According to their own accounts they lost 4,000 of their number.

The task of the security police was to set these purges in motion and put them on to the right track so as to ensure that the liquidation goals that had been set might be achieved in the shortest possible time. It was equally essential to create an established and provable fact for the future that the liberated population had taken the hardest measures against their Bolshevik and Jewish adversaries of their own accord without directions from German authorities being discernible.

In Lithuania this goal was achieved for the first time in Kaunas through the deployment of partisans. It was initially surprisingly difficult to set a fairly large-scale pogrom in motion there. The leader of the above-mentioned partisan group, Klimatis, who was the first to be recruited, succeeded in starting a pogrom on the basis of instructions he had been given by the small advance party that had been deployed in Kovno without any German orders or incitement being discernible.

Liepos 11 d. 1941 m.

1. In Kaunas, up to now a total of 7,800 Jews have been liquidated partly through pogroms and partly through shooting by Lithuanian Kommandos. All of the corpses have been removed. Further mass shootings are no longer possible. Therefore, I summoned a Jewish committee and explained that up to now we had no reason to interfere with the internal arrangements between Lithuanians and the Jews.

Foundations for a "New Order":

The establishment of a Jewish ghetto; identifying all the Jews with a yellow Star of David, 8 by 10 cm. in size, to be worn on the left breast; and the separate housing of women and children, for possible release on our orders by the Lithuanians and by a Jewish Relief Committee in the new ghetto. The town of Viliampol was designated as the location of the ghetto. The resettlement must be carried out within 4 weeks. Prisons now are being searched once more. Some Jews, for special reasons, are being arrested and shot. This will involve a minor number of executions, only 50 to 100 persons. To prevent Jews from returning to Kaunas, an agreement was made with the Higher SS and Police Leader that the ORPO draw a cordon around Kaunas not allowing any Jews to enter the town. If necessary, Jews will be fired upon. All Wehrmacht agencies were informed of the directives. About 250 men of the Lithuanian [anti-Soviet] partisans were left and are being sustained by us as a Sonderkommando and are being employed for future executions outside the town.

2. Units of Einsatzkommando 3 are presently working at Mariampol and Raseinial. After finishing their tasks, they will rejoin the Hauptkommando.

3. The Wehrmacht has received a new directive ordering it not to recognize the newly formed Lithuanian Government, but to make use of it.


Reinhard Heydrich, as head of the RSHA (Reich Security Main Office) issued periodic orders to the Einsatzgruppen. The third such order, dated July 2, 1941, states clearly:

4) Executions: To be executed are all functionaries of the Comintern (and all other professional communist politicians); the higher, middle and radical lower functionaries of the Party, the Central Committee and the regional district committees; Jews in State and Party posts; other radical elements (saboteurs, propagandists, snipers, assassins, agitators, etc). When in individual cases execution is necessary, it is of course to be carried out, but only after the case has been thoroughly investigated.


palyginti Ukrainoje

From Operational Situation Report USSR No. 111 12 October 1941 (my emphasis):

Einsatzgruppe C Location Kiev, reports: Security Police Measures

Sonderkommando 4a now has reached the total number of more than 51,000 executions. Apart from the special action in Kiev of 28 and 29 September, for which 2 Kommandos of the Police Regiment South were detached, all executions carried out so far were made by that special Kommando without any assistance from outside. The executed persons were mainly Jews, a minor part was political officials as well as saboteurs and looters.

On November 9, 1941, the number of people executed by SK 4a amounted to 97,243.


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Puslapis paskutinį kartą pakeistas 2012 lapkričio 02 d., 08:21