Introduction E9F5FC Understandable FFFFFF Questions FFFFC0 Notes EEEEEE Software 
Book.20170928Truth istorijaPaslėpti nežymius pakeitimus  Rodyti galutinio teksto pakeitimus 2017 lapkričio 29 d., 11:43
atliko 
Pakeista 1 eilutė iš:
į:
Abstract submitted to [[https://formaltruththeories.pl  Warsaw Workshop on Formal Truth Theories]], September 2830, 2017. Rejected. 2017 gegužės 16 d., 10:11
atliko 
Pridėtos 8487 eilutės:
 ''A diagram that I made for myself...'' 2017 gegužės 16 d., 10:10
atliko 
Pakeistos 8385 eilutės iš
* Pragmatic theories express this as our honesty in our selfcritique, our aspirations and our vulnerability. į:
* Pragmatic theories express this as our honesty in our selfcritique, our aspirations and our vulnerability. Attach:truth.png 2017 gegužės 16 d., 10:01
atliko 
Ištrintos 23 eilutės:
Pakeistos 83117 eilutės iš
* Pragmatic theories express this as our honesty in our selfcritique, our aspirations and our vulnerability. SoC goes beyond itself into itself, namely, Everything. Everything is the self of SoC. '''Truth as the Unique Referent Beyond a System''' Background: * Define everything * Define divisions of everything * Define representations * Define going beyond oneself * Define equation of life My results: * Define truth as a representation of the nullsome  that which cannot be hidden, that which has nothing between expression and content. And likewise define the representations of the nullsome and ground them in the foursome. * Define necessary, possible, actual with regard to truth, and similarly define the twelve topologies. * Antistructure * Sevensome and eightsome  ways of choosing  sources of mistakes * Truth is the gap within a restructuring and is the source of paradox. * Statements are typically tentative  we don't care to agree absolutely on what they mean  they are * Scopes of truth: everything, anything, something, nothing. * Truth as a distinguished (unmarked?) opposite. Results related to truth theories: * Truth is the unique referent which is beyond a system. And thus by definition truth cannot be solely systemic. But a system of this kind is completely explicit, thus truth is the only thing that is outside it. Truth refers to the original everything. And thus true is the opposite of the good. * Truth is that which can be "unmarked", that which can be without context, without conditions, taken at face value. * Truth is that which cannot be hidden. * Substantial and deflationary theories are the 6 representations based on views vs. concepts. * Axiomatic theories are possible (model), actual (proof), necessary (logical). * Statements are given by fusing views and concepts, or content and expression. į:
* Pragmatic theories express this as our honesty in our selfcritique, our aspirations and our vulnerability. 2017 gegužės 16 d., 01:36
atliko 
Pakeistos 8185 eilutės iš
In summary, į:
In summary, a study of what we can possibly imagine, and in particular, thinking backward from a state of contradiction, offers a comprehensive perspective upon Everything as needed for absolute truth. But such a perspective suggests that the most basic truth is admission of inherent selfcontradiction. * Substantive theories express this when we have views and concepts but not yet statements. * Deflationary theories express this when we have statements but not yet a formal System. * Formal theories express this for statements within a formal System such that truth is the unique referent beyond it. * Pragmatic theories express this as our honesty in our selfcritique, our aspirations and our vulnerability. 2017 gegužės 16 d., 01:29
atliko 
Pakeistos 7177 eilutės iš
pragmatic  truth is unknowable knowable is falsehood truth is honest selfcritique truth is the limit of selfcorrection truth is a confirmed expedient in thinking į:
If the original selfcontradiction manages to carve out of itself a noncontradictory System, then there may be thought to be a unique selfcontradictory referent (the Truth) beyond that System, as all such referents are equivalent, as regards the System. The distinction between the noncontradictory System and the original, selfcontradictory Metasystem is thus fundamental. From the System's point of view, we can consider the System as generated by metalingual extensions, but the ultimate extension will be that final referent, the Truth  the (Systemic) admission of (the original) selfcontradiction. In this way, we can discuss: * Tarski's semantic theory, whereby true statements are elements of an object language referred to as such by a metalanguage. * Kripke's theory, whereby true statements are generated by metalingual extensions. * Gupta and Belnap's revision theory, whereby true statements are based on circularity within the System, and so their extrasystemic content (their selfcontradiction) need not be interpreted. Finally, pragmatic theories are also compatible with defining truth as an admission of selfcontradiction. If the truth is unknowable, and what is knowable is falsehood, as Hocking claims, then we may have that: * Truth is honest selfcritique, as says Peirce. * Truth is the limit of selfcorrection, as says Dewey. * Truth is a confirmed expedient in thinking, as says James, which admits that our thinking is ever vulnerable. In summary, 2017 gegužės 16 d., 01:12
atliko 
Pakeista 60 eilutė iš:
Each of these representations of the nullsome triggers a representation of the division of everything into three perspectives. This threesome is for issues of participation, and defines a threecycle of taking a stand, following through, and reflecting, as with the scientific method. There are four representations of this threesome, yielding twelve circumstances, much like Kant's twelve categories, but based not on the logical form of a statement, but on the following "mind games": į:
Each of these representations of the nullsome triggers a representation of the division of everything into three perspectives. This threesome is for issues of participation, and defines a threecycle of taking a stand, following through, and reflecting, as with the scientific method. There are four representations of this threesome, yielding twelve circumstances, much like Kant's twelve categories, but based not on the logical form of a statement, but rather on the following "mind games": Pridėtos 6577 eilutės:
We can similarly distinguish: * Logic asserts Necessary truth. True statements are unconditional. * Proof theory asserts Actual truth. True statements are provable from true statements. * Model theory asserts Possible truth. True statements have interpretations as true statements semantic  true statements are elements of an object language referred to as such by a metalanguage pragmatic  truth is unknowable knowable is falsehood truth is honest selfcritique truth is the limit of selfcorrection truth is a confirmed expedient in thinking 2017 gegužės 16 d., 01:05
atliko 
Pakeistos 6065 eilutės iš
Each of these representations of the nullsome triggers a representation of the division of everything into three perspectives. This threesome is for issues of participation, and defines a threecycle of taking a stand, following through, and reflecting, as with the scientific method. į:
Each of these representations of the nullsome triggers a representation of the division of everything into three perspectives. This threesome is for issues of participation, and defines a threecycle of taking a stand, following through, and reflecting, as with the scientific method. There are four representations of this threesome, yielding twelve circumstances, much like Kant's twelve categories, but based not on the logical form of a statement, but on the following "mind games": * True yields Necessary, Actual, Possible. Consider content (a concept) and its expression (to a view). Then what may be true (unconcealable) is the content, in which case it is necessarily true, as with proof by contradiction. Or what may be true (unconcealable) is the expression, in which case it is Actually true, as when grounds yield consequences. Or what may be true (unconcealable) is the relation between the expression and the content, in which case it is Possibly true, as in the event of consistency. * Direct yields Object, Process, Subject. A Subject's attention may be directed by something else (an Object) or directed by itself (a Process). * Constant yields One, All, Many. If we search for constancy, then we may find One example. Otherwise, All is constantly unconstant. But also, what we select and what we judge must stay the same, and so that must be Multiply constant. * Significant yields Being, Doing, Thinking. If Thinking is significant (unencompassable), then so is the thinker  so is Being. If Being is significant, then so is Doing. If Doing is significant, then so is Thinking. 2017 gegužės 16 d., 00:55
atliko 
Pakeista 54 eilutė iš:
* True  not Whether  it cannot be hidden, like a bottle in a cupboard, so that nobody sees it. į:
* True  not Whether  it cannot be hidden, like a bottle in a cupboard, so that nobody sees it. In this sense it is unconcealed  aletheia. Pakeista 60 eilutė iš:
Each of these representations of the nullsome triggers a representation of the division of everything into three perspectives. į:
Each of these representations of the nullsome triggers a representation of the division of everything into three perspectives. This threesome is for issues of participation, and defines a threecycle of taking a stand, following through, and reflecting, as with the scientific method. 2017 gegužės 16 d., 00:53
atliko 
Pakeistos 5152 eilutės iš
We may think of a statement as arising from a view of a concept. Substantive theories base the truth in the relationship between views and concepts by which the statement will be established. Deflationary theories base the truth on the view or the concept of the statement which has already been established. We can think of these as the ways that a statement  an admission  can be made, so that it has the freedom to be an admission of selfcontradiction. į:
We may think of a statement as arising from a view of a concept. Substantive theories base the truth in the relationship between views and concepts by which the statement will be established. Deflationary theories base the truth on the view or the concept of the statement which has already been established. We can think of these as the ways that a statement  an admission  can be made, so that it has the freedom to be an admission of selfcontradiction. They are the ways that truth can be ascribed to a statement before it is part of a formal System. Let us now consider how truth can be defined when a formal System of statements is well defined. Namely, we can negate any level of knowledge, as conditional, so as to refer to the unconditional  the original selfcontradiction  which is beyond the System. This yields the concepts: * True  not Whether  it cannot be hidden, like a bottle in a cupboard, so that nobody sees it. * Direct  not What  it is not mediated by a representation. * Constant  not How  it does not change. * Significant  not Why  it is not encompassed. These concepts are, in fact, representations of the nullsome, the division of everything into zero perspectives, as by them we conceive that original selfcontradiction beyond the System. Each of these representations of the nullsome triggers a representation of the division of everything into three perspectives. 2017 gegužės 16 d., 00:42
atliko 
Pakeista 51 eilutė iš:
We may think of a statement as arising from a view of a concept. Substantive theories base the truth in the relationship between views and concepts by which the statement will be established. Deflationary theories base the truth on the view or the concept of the statement which has already been established. į:
We may think of a statement as arising from a view of a concept. Substantive theories base the truth in the relationship between views and concepts by which the statement will be established. Deflationary theories base the truth on the view or the concept of the statement which has already been established. We can think of these as the ways that a statement  an admission  can be made, so that it has the freedom to be an admission of selfcontradiction. 2017 gegužės 16 d., 00:38
atliko 
Pakeistos 4748 eilutės iš
This distinction is apparent in two deflationary theories * A view į:
This distinction is apparent in two deflationary theories which consider truth as asserting a statement: * A view is defined by performance. Truth is assent to a statement. * A concept is defined by redundancy. Truth is emphasis upon a statement. We may think of a statement as arising from a view of a concept. Substantive theories base the truth in the relationship between views and concepts by which the statement will be established. Deflationary theories base the truth on the view or the concept of the statement which has already been established. 2017 gegužės 16 d., 00:32
atliko 
Pakeistos 4748 eilutės iš
This distinction is apparent in two į:
This distinction is apparent in two deflationary theories: * A view 2017 gegužės 16 d., 00:32
atliko 
Pakeistos 4547 eilutės iš
This foursome has two representations. Idealists think of these levels of knowledge in terms of views for asking questions Why? How? What? and tend to dismiss Whether? Whereas Materialists think them in terms of concepts for stating answers Whether! What! How! and tend to dismiss Why! į:
This foursome has two representations. Idealists think of these levels of knowledge in terms of views for asking questions Why? How? What? and tend to dismiss Whether? Whereas Materialists think them in terms of concepts for stating answers Whether! What! How! and tend to dismiss Why! This distinction is apparent in two 2017 gegužės 16 d., 00:30
atliko 
Ištrintos 3839 eilutės:
Pakeistos 4043 eilutės iš
* Why it is true: consensus  views are compatible with each other  true positions are those which a group will agree upon į:
* Why it is true: consensus  views are compatible with each other  true positions are those which a group will agree upon. * How it is true: construction  a concept is compatible with views  true stands are those which are taken in a given social context. * What is true: correspondence  a view is compatible with concepts  true beliefs and true statements correspond to actual states of affairs. * Whether it is true: coherence  concepts are compatible with each other  a true system of concepts has them support each other. This foursome has two representations. Idealists think of these levels of knowledge in terms of views for asking questions Why? How? What? and tend to dismiss Whether? Whereas Materialists think them in terms of concepts for stating answers Whether! What! How! and tend to dismiss Why! 2017 gegužės 16 d., 00:29
atliko 
Pakeistos 4245 eilutės iš
* * construction  a concept is compatible with views  true stands are those which are taken in a given social context * correspondence  a view is compatible with concepts  * į:
* Why it is true: consensus  views are compatible with each other  true positions are those which a group will agree upon * How it is true: construction  a concept is compatible with views  true stands are those which are taken in a given social context * What is true: correspondence  a view is compatible with concepts  true beliefs and true statements correspond to actual states of affairs * Whether it is true: coherence  concepts are compatible with each other  a true system of concepts has them support each other 2017 gegužės 16 d., 00:27
atliko 
Pakeista 39 eilutė iš:
This foursome has two representations. Idealists think of these levels of knowledge in terms of į:
This foursome has two representations. Idealists think of these levels of knowledge in terms of views for asking questions Why? How? What? and tend to dismiss Whether? Whereas Materialists think them in terms of concepts for stating answers Whether! What! How! and tend to dismiss Why! 2017 gegužės 16 d., 00:25
atliko 
Pakeistos 4245 eilutės iš
* į:
* consensus  views are compatible with each other  true positions are those which a group will agree upon * construction  a concept is compatible with views  true stands are those which are taken in a given social context * correspondence  a view is compatible with concepts  true beliefs and true statements correspond to actual states of affairs * coherence  concepts are compatible with each other  a true system of concepts has them support each other 2017 gegužės 16 d., 00:22
atliko 
Pridėtos 4045 eilutės:
With all of this in mind, we can consider four substantive theories of truth: * * * * 2017 gegužės 16 d., 00:12
atliko 
Pakeista 34 eilutė iš:
* "Every medicine has its purpose." There is no way for such a statement to be false because it į:
* "Every medicine has its purpose." There is no way for such a statement to be false because it asserts its own semantics, what is to be meant by "medicine" or "purpose". 2017 gegužės 16 d., 00:10
atliko 
Pakeistos 3335 eilutės iš
Nothing, Something, Anything, Everything also arise as the structural scopes or selves by which the original {$ \bot_{O} $} retreats from itself, and goes beyond itself, and thus gives rise to itself, and goes into itself, arising as {$ \bot_{A} $}. This foursome has two representations. Idealists think of į:
Nothing, Something, Anything, Everything also arise as the structural scopes or selves by which the original {$ \bot_{O} $} retreats from itself, and goes beyond itself, and thus gives rise to itself, and goes into itself, arising as {$ \bot_{A} $}. Truth behaves very differently with regard to these scopes. For example, pragmatically: * "Every medicine has its purpose." There is no way for such a statement to be false because it defines its own semantics, what is to be meant by "medicine" or "purpose". * "Any medicine has its purpose." This statement requires us to know how to apply this assertion meaningfully to one case at a time, and thus have the knowledge that a doctor might have. * "Some medicine has its purpose." We are now as if participating in a particular conversation, for example, about aspirin, and we may or may not understand each other, as our terms may be quite tentative. * "No medicine has its purpose." Such a statement is purely formal and so will be absolutely right or wrong. This foursome has two representations. Idealists think of these levels of knowledge in terms of questions Why? How? What? and tend to dismiss Whether? Whereas Materialists think them in terms of answers Whether! What! How! and tend to dismiss Why! 2017 gegužės 15 d., 23:54
atliko 
Pakeistos 3133 eilutės iš
Issues of knowledge depend on four perspectives: Whether, What, How, Why. Let us illustrate what the levels of knowledge with regard to a water bottle. Our senses present us an image of What the bottle appears to be, in which case we know Something. Whereas our intellect thinks of the bottle as a blueprint for How it is created and used, the principles by which we know Anything. We experience our own life through these two modes, conditionally. And yet we can also conceive of two additional unconditional modes. We can consider Whether a bottle exists if it is hidden and nobody sees it, and so we know Nothing. In order to know Why a bottle exists, we would have to know Everything, for it is associated with absolutely everything. į:
Issues of knowledge depend on four perspectives: Whether, What, How, Why. Let us illustrate what the levels of knowledge with regard to a water bottle. Our senses present us an image of What the bottle appears to be, in which case we know Something. Whereas our intellect thinks of the bottle as a blueprint for How it is created and used, the principles by which we know Anything. We experience our own life through these two modes, conditionally. And yet we can also conceive of two additional unconditional modes. We can consider Whether a bottle exists if it is hidden and nobody sees it, and so we know Nothing. In order to know Why a bottle exists, we would have to know Everything, for it is associated with absolutely everything. Nothing, Something, Anything, Everything also arise as the structural scopes or selves by which the original {$ \bot_{O} $} retreats from itself, and goes beyond itself, and thus gives rise to itself, and goes into itself, arising as {$ \bot_{A} $}. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 23:49
atliko 
Pakeista 25 eilutė iš:
Let us now consider how divisions of everything are fundamental to our own cognition and how they ground and relate different theories of truth. For į:
Let us now consider how divisions of everything are fundamental to our own cognition and how they ground and relate different theories of truth. For issues of existence, we divide everything into two perspectives: "opposites coexist" (so that we can ask questions, does a chair exist or not?) and "all things are the same" (so that we can have answers  if it exists, then it exists, and if not, then not). We conceive of this deep structure through one of four different representations, namely: Pakeistos 3133 eilutės iš
į:
Issues of knowledge depend on four perspectives: Whether, What, How, Why. Let us illustrate what the levels of knowledge with regard to a water bottle. Our senses present us an image of What the bottle appears to be, in which case we know Something. Whereas our intellect thinks of the bottle as a blueprint for How it is created and used, the principles by which we know Anything. We experience our own life through these two modes, conditionally. And yet we can also conceive of two additional unconditional modes. We can consider Whether a bottle exists if it is hidden and nobody sees it, and so we know Nothing. In order to know Why a bottle exists, we would have to know Everything, for it is associated with absolutely everything. This foursome has two representations. Idealists think of these levels of knowledge in terms of questions Why? How? What? and tend to dismiss Whether? Whereas Materialists think them in terms of answers Whether! What! How! and tend to dismiss Why! 2017 gegužės 15 d., 23:43
atliko 
Pakeistos 2829 eilutės iš
* "theory" and "practice" (in theory, we are distinct from the process we study, but in practice, we become one with the process, reflecting each other, like grist in a mill, or molten bronze in a form); į:
* "theory" and "practice" (in theory, we are distinct from the process we study, but in practice, we become one with the process, reflecting each other, like grist in a mill, or molten bronze in a form); 2017 gegužės 15 d., 23:43
atliko 
Pakeistos 2730 eilutės iš
* "outside" and "inside" (if we are outside a cup, then there is also an inside, but if we fall inside, then there is only inside); * "theory" and "practice" (in theory, we are distinct from the process we study, but in practice, we become one with the process, reflecting each other, like grist in a mill, or molten bronze in a į:
* "outside" and "inside" (if we are outside a cup, then there is also an inside, but if we fall inside, then there is only inside); * "theory" and "practice" (in theory, we are distinct from the process we study, but in practice, we become one with the process, reflecting each other, like grist in a mill, or molten bronze in a Pakeistos 3031 eilutės iš
* "same" and "different" (for things to be the same, they must also be different, whereas if they are different, they are simply different). į:
* "same" and "different" (for things to be the same, they must also be different, whereas if they are different, they are simply different). 2017 gegužės 15 d., 23:43
atliko 
Pakeistos 2533 eilutės iš
Let us now consider how divisions of everything are fundamental to our own cognition and how they ground and relate different theories of truth. į:
Let us now consider how divisions of everything are fundamental to our own cognition and how they ground and relate different theories of truth. For questions of existence, we divide everything into two perspectives: "opposites coexist" (so that we can ask questions, does a chair exist or not?) and "all things are the same" (so that we can have answers  if it exists, then it exists, and if not, then not). We conceive of this deep structure through one of four different representations, namely: * "free will" and "fate"; * "outside" and "inside" (if we are outside a cup, then there is also an inside, but if we fall inside, then there is only inside); * "theory" and "practice" (in theory, we are distinct from the process we study, but in practice, we become one with the process, reflecting each other, like grist in a mill, or molten bronze in a form); * "same" and "different" (for things to be the same, they must also be different, whereas if they are different, they are simply different). 2017 gegužės 15 d., 23:38
atliko 
Pridėta 25 eilutė:
Let us now consider how divisions of everything are fundamental to our own cognition and how they ground and relate different theories of truth. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 23:37
atliko 
Pakeista 23 eilutė iš:
Such a process of divisions can be described further, but here I simply note  let us say, poetically  that a division of the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} into seven perspectives yields a noncontradictory System given by four corners and three sides of the logical square: {$ \forall x, \forall x \wedge \exists x,\exists x, \exists x \wedge \exists x \neg, \exists x \neg, \exists x \neg \wedge \forall x \neg, \forall x \neg $}. And yet an į:
Such a process of divisions can be described further, but here I simply note  let us say, poetically  that a division of the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} into seven perspectives yields a noncontradictory System given by four corners and three sides of the logical square: {$ \forall x, \forall x \wedge \exists x,\exists x, \exists x \wedge \exists x \neg, \exists x \neg, \exists x \neg \wedge \forall x \neg, \forall x \neg $}. And yet an eighth perspective {$ \forall x \wedge \forall x \neg $} indicates that the entire System is empty, or equivalently, yields our original state of selfcontradiction. This eighth perspective may be taken as a unique referent beyond the System which, if referenced, can make the entire System collapse, as an affirmation of selfcontradiction. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 23:36
atliko 
Pakeista 23 eilutė iš:
Such a process of divisions can be described further, but here I simply note  let us say, poetically  that a division of the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} into seven perspectives yields a noncontradictory System given by four corners and three sides of the logical square: {$ \forall x, \forall x \wedge \exists x,\exists x, \exists x \wedge \exists x \neg, \exists x \neg, \exists x \neg \wedge \forall x \neg, \forall x \neg $}. į:
Such a process of divisions can be described further, but here I simply note  let us say, poetically  that a division of the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} into seven perspectives yields a noncontradictory System given by four corners and three sides of the logical square: {$ \forall x, \forall x \wedge \exists x,\exists x, \exists x \wedge \exists x \neg, \exists x \neg, \exists x \neg \wedge \forall x \neg, \forall x \neg $}. And yet an eight perspective {$ \forall x \wedge \forall x \neg $} makes the entire System empty, or equivalently, yields our original state of selfcontradiction. This eighth perspective may be taken as a unique referent beyond the System which, if referenced, can make the entire System collapse, as an affirmation of selfcontradiction. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 23:34
atliko 
Pakeista 23 eilutė iš:
Such a process of divisions can be described further, but here I simply note that a division of the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} into seven perspectives yields a noncontradictory System given by four corners and three sides of the logical square: {$ \forall x, \forall x \wedge \exists x,\exists x, \exists x \wedge \exists x \neg, \exists x \neg, \exists x \neg \wedge \forall x \neg, \forall x \neg $}. But an eight perspective {$ \forall x \wedge \forall x \neg $} makes the entire System empty, or equivalently, yields our original state of selfcontradiction. į:
Such a process of divisions can be described further, but here I simply note  let us say, poetically  that a division of the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} into seven perspectives yields a noncontradictory System given by four corners and three sides of the logical square: {$ \forall x, \forall x \wedge \exists x,\exists x, \exists x \wedge \exists x \neg, \exists x \neg, \exists x \neg \wedge \forall x \neg, \forall x \neg $}. But an eight perspective {$ \forall x \wedge \forall x \neg $} makes the entire System empty, or equivalently, yields our original state of selfcontradiction. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 23:33
atliko 
Pakeista 23 eilutė iš:
Such a process of divisions can be described further, but here I simply note that a division of the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} into seven perspectives yields a noncontradictory System given by four corners and three sides of the logical square: {$ \forall x, \forall x \wedge \exists x,\exists x, \exists x \wedge \exists x \neg, \exists x \neg, \exists x \neg \wedge \forall x \neg, \forall x \neg $}. į:
Such a process of divisions can be described further, but here I simply note that a division of the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} into seven perspectives yields a noncontradictory System given by four corners and three sides of the logical square: {$ \forall x, \forall x \wedge \exists x,\exists x, \exists x \wedge \exists x \neg, \exists x \neg, \exists x \neg \wedge \forall x \neg, \forall x \neg $}. But an eight perspective {$ \forall x \wedge \forall x \neg $} makes the entire System empty, or equivalently, yields our original state of selfcontradiction. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 23:31
atliko 
Pakeistos 2325 eilutės iš
į:
Such a process of divisions can be described further, but here I simply note that a division of the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} into seven perspectives yields a noncontradictory System given by four corners and three sides of the logical square: {$ \forall x, \forall x \wedge \exists x,\exists x, \exists x \wedge \exists x \neg, \exists x \neg, \exists x \neg \wedge \forall x \neg, \forall x \neg $}. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 23:23
atliko 
Pridėtos 2223 eilutės:
This trinity is from the pointofview of the original selfcontradiction in the language. But from the arisen selfcontradiction in the statement, it looks different. {$ \bot_{O} $} 2017 gegužės 15 d., 23:09
atliko 
Pakeista 21 eilutė iš:
Next, it might consider, what is it that identifies the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} with the arisen contradiction {$ \bot_{A} $}? We may say that {$ \bot_{O} $} understands (separates itself and its negation into separate statements) and that {$ \bot_{A} $} comes to understand (likewise separates itself and its negation, but within the same statement) and so they understand the same negation {$ \neg \bot \equiv \bot_{N} $}, which separates itself within the same term {$ \neg \bot $}, and which is the contradiction that is understood. And here the initial state of selfcontradiction has divided itself into three perspectives  three scopes for selfcontradiction  the language ({$ \bot_{O} $}), the statement ({$ \bot_{A} $}) and the term ({$ \bot_{N} $}). As Godel showed with his Incompleteness theorems, if statements determine a language (it is complete), and terms determine sentences (they are consistent), and the language determines its terms (whether to interpret them syntactically or semantically, so that they are able to contradict themselves), then there indeed must be a contradiction. Or, thinking backwards, a state of contradiction may divide itself into three perspectives, that of a language, a statement and a term. į:
Next, it might consider, what is it that identifies the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} with the arisen contradiction {$ \bot_{A} $}? We may say that {$ \bot_{O} $} understands (separates itself and its negation into separate statements) and that {$ \bot_{A} $} comes to understand (likewise separates itself and its negation, but within the same statement) and so they understand the same negation {$ \neg \bot \equiv \bot_{N} $}, which separates itself within the same term {$ \neg \bot $}, and which is the contradiction that is understood. And here the initial state of selfcontradiction has divided itself into three perspectives  three scopes for selfcontradiction  the language ({$ \bot_{O} $}), the statement ({$ \bot_{A} $}) and the term ({$ \bot_{N} $}). As Godel showed with his Incompleteness theorems, if statements determine a language (it is complete), and terms determine sentences (they are consistent), and the language determines its terms (whether to interpret them syntactically or semantically, so that they are able to contradict themselves), then there indeed must be a contradiction somewhere. Or, thinking backwards, a state of contradiction may divide itself into three perspectives, that of a language, a statement and a term. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 22:57
atliko 
Pakeista 21 eilutė iš:
Next, it might consider, what is it that identifies the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} with the arisen contradiction {$ \bot_{A} $}? We may say that {$ \bot_{O} $} understands (separates itself and its negation into separate statements) and that {$ \bot_{A} $} comes to understand (likewise separates itself and its negation, but within the same statement) and so they understand the same negation {$ \neg \bot \equiv \bot_{N} $}, which separates itself within the same term {$ \neg \bot $}, and which is the contradiction that is understood. And here the initial state of selfcontradiction has divided itself into three perspectives  three scopes for selfcontradiction  the language ({$ \bot_{O} $}), the statement ({$ \bot_{A} $}) and the term ({$ \bot_{N} $}). As Godel showed with his Incompleteness theorems, if statements determine a language (it is complete), and terms determine sentences (they are consistent), and the language determines its terms (whether to interpret them syntactically or semantically, so that they are able to contradict themselves), then there indeed must be a contradiction. Or, thinking backwards, a state of contradiction may divide itself into three perspectives that of a language, a statement and a term. į:
Next, it might consider, what is it that identifies the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} with the arisen contradiction {$ \bot_{A} $}? We may say that {$ \bot_{O} $} understands (separates itself and its negation into separate statements) and that {$ \bot_{A} $} comes to understand (likewise separates itself and its negation, but within the same statement) and so they understand the same negation {$ \neg \bot \equiv \bot_{N} $}, which separates itself within the same term {$ \neg \bot $}, and which is the contradiction that is understood. And here the initial state of selfcontradiction has divided itself into three perspectives  three scopes for selfcontradiction  the language ({$ \bot_{O} $}), the statement ({$ \bot_{A} $}) and the term ({$ \bot_{N} $}). As Godel showed with his Incompleteness theorems, if statements determine a language (it is complete), and terms determine sentences (they are consistent), and the language determines its terms (whether to interpret them syntactically or semantically, so that they are able to contradict themselves), then there indeed must be a contradiction. Or, thinking backwards, a state of contradiction may divide itself into three perspectives, that of a language, a statement and a term. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 22:55
atliko 
Pakeista 21 eilutė iš:
Next, it might consider, what is it that identifies the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} with the arisen contradiction {$ \bot_{A} $}? We may say that {$ \bot_{O} $} understands (separates itself and its negation into separate statements) and that {$ \bot_{A} $} comes to understand (likewise separates itself and its negation, but within the same statement) and so they understand the same negation {$ \neg \bot \equiv \bot_{N} $}, which separates itself within the same term {$ \neg \bot $}, and which is the contradiction that is understood. And here the initial state of selfcontradiction has divided itself into three perspectives  three scopes for selfcontradiction  the language ({$ \bot_{O} $}), the į:
Next, it might consider, what is it that identifies the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} with the arisen contradiction {$ \bot_{A} $}? We may say that {$ \bot_{O} $} understands (separates itself and its negation into separate statements) and that {$ \bot_{A} $} comes to understand (likewise separates itself and its negation, but within the same statement) and so they understand the same negation {$ \neg \bot \equiv \bot_{N} $}, which separates itself within the same term {$ \neg \bot $}, and which is the contradiction that is understood. And here the initial state of selfcontradiction has divided itself into three perspectives  three scopes for selfcontradiction  the language ({$ \bot_{O} $}), the statement ({$ \bot_{A} $}) and the term ({$ \bot_{N} $}). As Godel showed with his Incompleteness theorems, if statements determine a language (it is complete), and terms determine sentences (they are consistent), and the language determines its terms (whether to interpret them syntactically or semantically, so that they are able to contradict themselves), then there indeed must be a contradiction. Or, thinking backwards, a state of contradiction may divide itself into three perspectives that of a language, a statement and a term. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 22:26
atliko 
Pakeista 16 eilutė iš:
* Everything is the simplest possible algorithm, the one which has no filter but accepts all things, whatever we think of. This means that we all have the same Everything, although we may call it by different names, such as Being į:
* Everything is the simplest possible algorithm, the one which has no filter but accepts all things, whatever we think of. This means that we all have the same Everything, although we may call it by different names, such as Being (all that is), Love (all that is loved), etc. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 22:15
atliko 
Pakeista 9 eilutė iš:
In other words, I take the nature of truth to be inherent in the Liar's paradox, "I contradict myself". I identify with a State of Contradiction ({$ \bot $}) and then imagine how it gives rise to a State of Noncontradiction (a System). In doing so, I document my exploration of the cognitive limits of my imagination, and perhaps, our imagination. į:
In other words, I take the nature of truth to be inherent in the Liar's paradox, "I contradict myself". My thinking here is quite backward! I identify with a State of Contradiction ({$ \bot $}) and then imagine how it gives rise to a State of Noncontradiction (a System). In doing so, I document my exploration of the cognitive limits of my imagination, and perhaps, our imagination. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 22:12
atliko 
Pakeistos 1921 eilutės iš
In mathematics, {$ \bot $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. I try to imagine what such a vantage point might ever yield, and in particular, how might it retreat so as to give rise to a state of noncontradiction? I am only able to suppose that it asks itself, Is {$ \bot $} necessary? Would it be, even if it wasn't? And then it proceeds by dividing itself into perspectives, as with a proof by contradiction, whereby it yields two perspectives: {$ \bot \rightarrow \bot $} (if it exists, then it exists) and {$ \neg \bot \rightarrow \bot$} (if it does not exist, yet even so, it exists). Next, it might consider, what is it that identifies the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} with the arisen contradiction {$ \bot_{A} $}? We may say that {$ \bot_{O} $} understands (separates itself and its negation into separate statements) and that {$ \bot_{A} $} comes to understand (likewise separates itself and its negation, but within the same statement) and so they understand the same negation {$ \neg \bot \equiv \bot_{N} $}, which separates itself within the same term {$ \neg \bot $}, and which is the contradiction that is understood. And here the initial state of selfcontradiction has divided itself into three perspectives  three scopes for selfcontradiction  the language ({$ \bot_{O} $}), the sentence ({$ \bot_{A} $}) and the term ({$ \bot_{N} $}). As Godel showed with his Incompleteness theorem, į:
In mathematics, {$ \bot $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. I try to imagine what such a vantage point might ever yield, and in particular, how might it retreat so as to give rise to a state of noncontradiction? I am only able to suppose that it asks itself, Is {$ \bot $} necessary? Would it be, even if it wasn't? And then it proceeds by dividing itself into perspectives, as with a proof by contradiction, whereby it yields two perspectives: {$ \bot \rightarrow \bot $} (if it exists, then it exists) and {$ \neg \bot \rightarrow \bot$} (if it does not exist, yet even so, it exists). Next, it might consider, what is it that identifies the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} with the arisen contradiction {$ \bot_{A} $}? We may say that {$ \bot_{O} $} understands (separates itself and its negation into separate statements) and that {$ \bot_{A} $} comes to understand (likewise separates itself and its negation, but within the same statement) and so they understand the same negation {$ \neg \bot \equiv \bot_{N} $}, which separates itself within the same term {$ \neg \bot $}, and which is the contradiction that is understood. And here the initial state of selfcontradiction has divided itself into three perspectives  three scopes for selfcontradiction  the language ({$ \bot_{O} $}), the sentence ({$ \bot_{A} $}) and the term ({$ \bot_{N} $}). As Godel showed with his Incompleteness theorem, 2017 gegužės 15 d., 22:09
atliko 
Pakeista 19 eilutė iš:
In mathematics, {$ \bot $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. I try to imagine what such a vantage point might ever yield, and in particular, how might it retreat so as to give rise to a state of noncontradiction? I am only able to suppose that it asks itself, Is {$ \bot $} necessary? Would it be, even if it wasn't? And then it proceeds by dividing itself into perspectives, as with a proof by contradiction, whereby it yields two perspectives: {$ \bot \rightarrow \bot $} (if it exists, then it exists) and {$ \neg \bot \rightarrow \bot$} (if it does not exist, yet even so, it exists). Next, it might consider, what is it that identifies the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} with the arisen contradiction {$ \bot_{A} $}? We may say that {$ \bot_{O} $} understands (separates itself and its negation into separate statements) and that {$ \bot_{A} $} comes to understand (likewise separates itself and its negation, but within the same statement) and so they understand the same negation {$ \neg \bot \equiv \bot_{N} $}, which separates itself within the same term {$ \neg \bot $}, and which is the contradiction that is understood. And here the initial state of contradiction has divided itself into three perspectives  į:
In mathematics, {$ \bot $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. I try to imagine what such a vantage point might ever yield, and in particular, how might it retreat so as to give rise to a state of noncontradiction? I am only able to suppose that it asks itself, Is {$ \bot $} necessary? Would it be, even if it wasn't? And then it proceeds by dividing itself into perspectives, as with a proof by contradiction, whereby it yields two perspectives: {$ \bot \rightarrow \bot $} (if it exists, then it exists) and {$ \neg \bot \rightarrow \bot$} (if it does not exist, yet even so, it exists). Next, it might consider, what is it that identifies the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} with the arisen contradiction {$ \bot_{A} $}? We may say that {$ \bot_{O} $} understands (separates itself and its negation into separate statements) and that {$ \bot_{A} $} comes to understand (likewise separates itself and its negation, but within the same statement) and so they understand the same negation {$ \neg \bot \equiv \bot_{N} $}, which separates itself within the same term {$ \neg \bot $}, and which is the contradiction that is understood. And here the initial state of selfcontradiction has divided itself into three perspectives  three scopes for selfcontradiction  the language ({$ \bot_{O} $}), the sentence ({$ \bot_{A} $}) and the term ({$ \bot_{N} $}). As Godel showed with his Incompleteness theorem, 2017 gegužės 15 d., 22:07
atliko 
Pakeista 19 eilutė iš:
In mathematics, {$ \bot $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. I try to imagine what such a vantage point might ever yield, and in particular, how might it retreat so as to give rise to a state of noncontradiction? I am only able to suppose that it asks itself, Is {$ \bot $} necessary? Would it be, even if it wasn't? And then it proceeds by dividing itself into perspectives, as with a proof by contradiction, whereby it yields two perspectives: {$ \bot \rightarrow \bot $} (if it exists, then it exists) and {$ \neg \bot \rightarrow \bot$} (if it does not exist, yet even so, it exists). Next, it might consider, what is it that identifies the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} with the arisen contradiction {$ \bot_{A} $}? We may say that {$ \bot_{O} $} understands (separates itself and its negation into separate statements) and that {$ \bot_{A} $} comes to understand (likewise separates itself and its negation, but within the same statement) and so they understand the same negation {$ \neg \bot \equiv \bot_{N} $}, which separates itself within the same term {$ \neg \bot $}, and which is the contradiction that is understood. į:
In mathematics, {$ \bot $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. I try to imagine what such a vantage point might ever yield, and in particular, how might it retreat so as to give rise to a state of noncontradiction? I am only able to suppose that it asks itself, Is {$ \bot $} necessary? Would it be, even if it wasn't? And then it proceeds by dividing itself into perspectives, as with a proof by contradiction, whereby it yields two perspectives: {$ \bot \rightarrow \bot $} (if it exists, then it exists) and {$ \neg \bot \rightarrow \bot$} (if it does not exist, yet even so, it exists). Next, it might consider, what is it that identifies the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} with the arisen contradiction {$ \bot_{A} $}? We may say that {$ \bot_{O} $} understands (separates itself and its negation into separate statements) and that {$ \bot_{A} $} comes to understand (likewise separates itself and its negation, but within the same statement) and so they understand the same negation {$ \neg \bot \equiv \bot_{N} $}, which separates itself within the same term {$ \neg \bot $}, and which is the contradiction that is understood. And here the initial state of contradiction has divided itself into three perspectives  the language, the sentence and the term. As Godel showed with his Incompleteness theorem, 2017 gegužės 15 d., 22:05
atliko 
Pakeista 19 eilutė iš:
In mathematics, {$ \bot $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. I try to imagine what such a vantage point might ever yield, and in particular, how might it retreat so as to give rise to a state of noncontradiction? I am only able to suppose that it asks itself, Is {$ \bot $} necessary? Would it be, even if it wasn't? And then it proceeds by dividing itself into perspectives, as with a proof by contradiction, whereby it yields two perspectives: {$ \bot \rightarrow \bot $} (if it exists, then it exists) and {$ \neg \bot \rightarrow \bot$} (if it does not exist, yet even so, it exists). Next, it might consider, what is it that identifies the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} with the arisen contradiction {$ \bot_{A} $}? We may say that {$ \bot_{O} $} understands (separates itself and its negation into separate statements) and that {$ \bot_{A} $} comes to understand (likewise separates itself and its negation, but within the same statement) and so they understand the same negation {$ \neg \bot į:
In mathematics, {$ \bot $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. I try to imagine what such a vantage point might ever yield, and in particular, how might it retreat so as to give rise to a state of noncontradiction? I am only able to suppose that it asks itself, Is {$ \bot $} necessary? Would it be, even if it wasn't? And then it proceeds by dividing itself into perspectives, as with a proof by contradiction, whereby it yields two perspectives: {$ \bot \rightarrow \bot $} (if it exists, then it exists) and {$ \neg \bot \rightarrow \bot$} (if it does not exist, yet even so, it exists). Next, it might consider, what is it that identifies the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} with the arisen contradiction {$ \bot_{A} $}? We may say that {$ \bot_{O} $} understands (separates itself and its negation into separate statements) and that {$ \bot_{A} $} comes to understand (likewise separates itself and its negation, but within the same statement) and so they understand the same negation {$ \neg \bot \equiv \bot_{N} $}, which separates itself within the same term {$ \neg \bot $}, and which is the contradiction that is understood. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 22:03
atliko 
Pakeista 19 eilutė iš:
In mathematics, {$ \bot $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. I try to imagine what such a vantage point might ever yield, and in particular, how might it retreat so as to give rise to a state of noncontradiction? I am only able to suppose that it asks itself, Is {$ \bot $} necessary? Would it be, even if it wasn't? And then it proceeds by dividing itself into perspectives, as with a proof by contradiction, whereby it yields two perspectives: {$ \bot \rightarrow \bot $} (if it exists, then it exists) and {$ \neg \bot \rightarrow \bot$} (if it does not exist, yet even so, it exists). Next, it might consider, what is it that identifies the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} with the arisen contradiction {$ \bot_{A} $}? We may say that {$ \bot_{O} $} understands (separates itself and its negation į:
In mathematics, {$ \bot $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. I try to imagine what such a vantage point might ever yield, and in particular, how might it retreat so as to give rise to a state of noncontradiction? I am only able to suppose that it asks itself, Is {$ \bot $} necessary? Would it be, even if it wasn't? And then it proceeds by dividing itself into perspectives, as with a proof by contradiction, whereby it yields two perspectives: {$ \bot \rightarrow \bot $} (if it exists, then it exists) and {$ \neg \bot \rightarrow \bot$} (if it does not exist, yet even so, it exists). Next, it might consider, what is it that identifies the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} with the arisen contradiction {$ \bot_{A} $}? We may say that {$ \bot_{O} $} understands (separates itself and its negation into separate statements) and that {$ \bot_{A} $} comes to understand (likewise separates itself and its negation, but within the same statement) and so they understand the same negation {$ \neg \bot = \bot_{N} $}, which separates itself within the same term, and which is the contradiction that is understood. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 22:01
atliko 
Pakeistos 1920 eilutės iš
In mathematics, {$ \bot $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. I try to imagine what such a vantage point might ever yield, and in particular, how might it retreat so as to give rise to a state of noncontradiction? I am only able to suppose that it asks itself, Is {$ \bot $} necessary? Would it be, even if it wasn't? And then it proceeds by dividing itself into perspectives, as with a proof by contradiction, whereby it yields two perspectives: {$ \bot \rightarrow \bot $} (if it exists, then it exists) and {$ į:
In mathematics, {$ \bot $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. I try to imagine what such a vantage point might ever yield, and in particular, how might it retreat so as to give rise to a state of noncontradiction? I am only able to suppose that it asks itself, Is {$ \bot $} necessary? Would it be, even if it wasn't? And then it proceeds by dividing itself into perspectives, as with a proof by contradiction, whereby it yields two perspectives: {$ \bot \rightarrow \bot $} (if it exists, then it exists) and {$ \neg \bot \rightarrow \bot$} (if it does not exist, yet even so, it exists). Next, it might consider, what is it that identifies the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} with the arisen contradiction {$ \bot_{A} $}? We may say that {$ \bot_{O} $} understands (separates itself and its negation) and that {$ \bot_{A} $} comes to understand (likewise separates itself and its negation) and so they understand the same negation {$ \neg \bot = \bot_{N} $}, which is the contradiction that is understood. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 21:57
atliko 
Pakeista 19 eilutė iš:
In mathematics, {$ \bot $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. I try to imagine what such a vantage point might ever yield, and in particular, how might it retreat so as to give rise to a state of noncontradiction? I am only able to suppose that it asks itself, Is {$ \bot $} necessary? Would it be, even if it wasn't? And then it proceeds by dividing itself into perspectives, as with a proof by contradiction, whereby it yields two perspectives: {$ \bot \rightarrow \bot $} (if it exists, then it exists) and {$\neg \bot \rightarrow \bot$} (if it does not exist, yet even so, it exists). Next, it might consider, what is it that į:
In mathematics, {$ \bot $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. I try to imagine what such a vantage point might ever yield, and in particular, how might it retreat so as to give rise to a state of noncontradiction? I am only able to suppose that it asks itself, Is {$ \bot $} necessary? Would it be, even if it wasn't? And then it proceeds by dividing itself into perspectives, as with a proof by contradiction, whereby it yields two perspectives: {$ \bot \rightarrow \bot $} (if it exists, then it exists) and {$\neg \bot \rightarrow \bot$} (if it does not exist, yet even so, it exists). Next, it might consider, what is it that identifies the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} with the arisen contradiction {$ \bot_{A} $}? It is that they 2017 gegužės 15 d., 21:56
atliko 
Pakeista 19 eilutė iš:
In mathematics, {$ \bot $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. I try to imagine what such a vantage point might ever yield, and in particular, how might it retreat so as to give rise to a state of noncontradiction? I am only able to suppose that it asks itself, Is {$ \bot $} necessary? Would it be, even if it wasn't? And then it proceeds by dividing itself into perspectives, as with a proof by contradiction, whereby it yields two perspectives: {$ \bot \rightarrow \bot $} (if it exists, then it exists) and {$\neg \bot \rightarrow \bot$} (if it does not exist, yet even so, it exists). į:
In mathematics, {$ \bot $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. I try to imagine what such a vantage point might ever yield, and in particular, how might it retreat so as to give rise to a state of noncontradiction? I am only able to suppose that it asks itself, Is {$ \bot $} necessary? Would it be, even if it wasn't? And then it proceeds by dividing itself into perspectives, as with a proof by contradiction, whereby it yields two perspectives: {$ \bot \rightarrow \bot $} (if it exists, then it exists) and {$\neg \bot \rightarrow \bot$} (if it does not exist, yet even so, it exists). Next, it might consider, what is it that equates the original contradiction {$ \bot_{O} $} with the arisen contradiction {$ \bot_{A} $}? It is that they 2017 gegužės 15 d., 21:54
atliko 
Pakeista 19 eilutė iš:
In mathematics, {$ \bot $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. I try to imagine what such a vantage point might ever yield į:
In mathematics, {$ \bot $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. I try to imagine what such a vantage point might ever yield, and in particular, how might it retreat so as to give rise to a state of noncontradiction? I am only able to suppose that it asks itself, Is {$ \bot $} necessary? Would it be, even if it wasn't? And then it proceeds by dividing itself into perspectives, as with a proof by contradiction, whereby it yields two perspectives: {$ \bot \rightarrow \bot $} (if it exists, then it exists) and {$\neg \bot \rightarrow \bot$} (if it does not exist, yet even so, it exists). But what i 2017 gegužės 15 d., 21:50
atliko 
Pakeista 19 eilutė iš:
In mathematics, {$ \bot $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. I try to imagine what such a vantage point might ever yield. I am only able to suppose that it asks itself, Is {$ \bot $} necessary? Would it be, even if it wasn't? And then it proceeds by dividing itself into perspectives, as with a proof by contradiction, whereby it yields two perspectives: {$ \bot \rightarrow \bot $} į:
In mathematics, {$ \bot $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. I try to imagine what such a vantage point might ever yield. I am only able to suppose that it asks itself, Is {$ \bot $} necessary? Would it be, even if it wasn't? And then it proceeds by dividing itself into perspectives, as with a proof by contradiction, whereby it yields two perspectives: {$ \bot \rightarrow \bot $} (if it exists, then it exists) and {$\neg \bot \rightarrow \bot$} (if it does not exist, yet even so, it exists). But how do we know that 2017 gegužės 15 d., 21:49
atliko 
Pakeista 19 eilutė iš:
In mathematics, {$ \bot $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. I try to imagine what such a vantage point might ever yield. I am only able to suppose that it asks itself, Is {$ \bot $} necessary? Would it be, even if it wasn't? And then it proceeds by dividing itself into perspectives, as with a proof by contradiction, whereby it yields two perspectives: {$ \bot $} į:
In mathematics, {$ \bot $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. I try to imagine what such a vantage point might ever yield. I am only able to suppose that it asks itself, Is {$ \bot $} necessary? Would it be, even if it wasn't? And then it proceeds by dividing itself into perspectives, as with a proof by contradiction, whereby it yields two perspectives: {$ \bot \rightarrow \bot $} and {$\neg \bot \rightarrow \bot$}. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 21:44
atliko 
Pakeistos 910 eilutės iš
In other words, I take the nature of truth to be inherent in the Liar's paradox, "I contradict myself". I identify with a State of Contradiction ({$ \ į:
In other words, I take the nature of truth to be inherent in the Liar's paradox, "I contradict myself". I identify with a State of Contradiction ({$ \bot $}) and then imagine how it gives rise to a State of Noncontradiction (a System). In doing so, I document my exploration of the cognitive limits of my imagination, and perhaps, our imagination. Pakeista 19 eilutė iš:
In mathematics, {$ \ į:
In mathematics, {$ \bot $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. I try to imagine what such a vantage point might ever yield. I am only able to suppose that it asks itself, Is {$ \bot $} necessary? Would it be, even if it wasn't? And then it proceeds by dividing itself into perspectives, as with a proof by contradiction, whereby it yields two perspectives: {$ \bot $} 2017 gegužės 15 d., 21:38
atliko 
Pakeistos 1112 eilutės iš
I relate admission of selfcontradiction to Heidegger's "unconcealment" and the orginal Greek term Aletheia, as well as to 4 substantialist theories, 2 deflationary theories, 3 pragmatist theories and 6 formal theories described in the Wikipedia article, in English, on Truth. į:
I relate admission of selfcontradiction to Heidegger's "unconcealment" and the orginal Greek term Aletheia, as well as to truth as understood by 4 substantialist theories, 2 deflationary theories, 3 pragmatist theories and 6 formal theories described in the Wikipedia article, in English, on Truth. Pakeistos 1920 eilutės iš
In mathematics, {$ \Rightarrow \Leftarrow $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. į:
In mathematics, {$ \Rightarrow \Leftarrow $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. I try to imagine what such a vantage point might ever yield. I am only able to suppose that it asks itself, Is {$ \Rightarrow \Leftarrow $} necessary? Would it be, even if it wasn't? And then it proceeds by dividing itself into perspectives, as with a proof by contradiction, whereby it yields two perspectives: {$ \Rightarrow \Leftarrow $} 2017 gegužės 15 d., 21:31
atliko 
Pakeista 19 eilutė iš:
In mathematics, į:
In mathematics, {$ \Rightarrow \Leftarrow $} is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 21:30
atliko 
Pakeista 19 eilutė iš:
In mathematics, ({$ \Rightarrow \Leftarrow $}) is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus į:
In mathematics, ({$ \Rightarrow \Leftarrow $}) is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus a view upon Everything. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 21:30
atliko 
Pakeista 19 eilutė iš:
In mathematics, į:
In mathematics, ({$ \Rightarrow \Leftarrow $}) is a vantage point from which all statements are true, and is thus quite related to Everything. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 21:29
atliko 
Pridėtos 1819 eilutės:
In mathematics, the State of Contradiction is one in which all statements are true, and is thus quite related to Everything. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 21:27
atliko 
Pakeistos 1617 eilutės iš
* Everything is the simplest possible algorithm, the one which has no filter but accepts all things, whatever we think of. This means that we have the į:
* Everything is the simplest possible algorithm, the one which has no filter but accepts all things, whatever we think of. This means that we all have the same Everything, although we may call it by different names, such as Being, Love, etc. * Everything is a required concept. We all have it, and appeal to it, for example, when we take a stand, which we do with regard to everything. We could not have learned of Everything, because all that we know is bounded, but Everything is unbounded. We cannot rid ourselves of it as a concept. It must have always been with us. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 21:21
atliko 
Pakeistos 1314 eilutės iš
A comprehensive theory of truth all but supposes a comprehensive view upon everything. į:
A comprehensive theory of truth all but supposes a comprehensive view upon everything and thus a vantage point for absolute truth. In logic, the "set of all sets" is a problematic concept which resembles "everything" but imposes upon it notions of "sets" and "elements". Let us instead consider Everything intuitively, in its everyday sense, and formally refer to it as that which has the following four properties: * Everything has no external context. If you put it in a box, then it includes the box. If you think it, it includes you. * Everything has no internal structure. It can be chaotic or orderly. Thus, all statements are true about everything, for there is no structure to hold onto: Everything is hot, everything is cold, everything is good, everything is bad. * Everything is the simplest possible algorithm, the one which has no filter but accepts all things, whatever we think of. This means that we have the 2017 gegužės 15 d., 20:23
atliko 
Pakeista 14 eilutė iš:
A comprehensive theory of truth į:
A comprehensive theory of truth all but supposes a comprehensive view upon everything. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 20:21
atliko 
Pakeista 11 eilutė iš:
I relate admission of selfcontradiction to Heidegger's "unconcealment" and the orginal Greek term Aletheia to 4 substantialist theories, 2 deflationary theories, 3 pragmatist theories and 6 formal theories described in the Wikipedia article, in English, on Truth. į:
I relate admission of selfcontradiction to Heidegger's "unconcealment" and the orginal Greek term Aletheia, as well as to 4 substantialist theories, 2 deflationary theories, 3 pragmatist theories and 6 formal theories described in the Wikipedia article, in English, on Truth. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 20:18
atliko 
Pakeista 9 eilutė iš:
In other words, I take the į:
In other words, I take the nature of truth to be inherent in the Liar's paradox, "I contradict myself". I identify with a State of Contradiction ({$ \Rightarrow \Leftarrow $}) and then imagine how it gives rise to a State of Noncontradiction (a System). In doing so, I document my exploration of the cognitive limits of my imagination, and perhaps, our imagination. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 20:15
atliko 
Pakeista 9 eilutė iš:
In other words, I take the Liar's paradox  "I contradict myself"  as the nature of truth. į:
In other words, I take the Liar's paradox  "I contradict myself"  as the nature of truth. This makes sense if I identify with a State of Contradiction ({$ \Rightarrow \Leftarrow $}) and then imagine how it gives rise to a State of Noncontradiction (a System). This hinges on exploring the cognitive limits of our imagination. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 20:13
atliko 
Pakeista 9 eilutė iš:
In other words, I take the Liar's paradox  "I contradict myself"  as the nature of truth. I identify with a State of Contradiction ({$ \Rightarrow \Leftarrow $}) and į:
In other words, I take the Liar's paradox  "I contradict myself"  as the nature of truth. I identify with a State of Contradiction ({$ \Rightarrow \Leftarrow $}) and imagine how it gives rise to a State of Noncontradiction (a System). This hinges on exploring the cognitive limits of our imagination. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 20:09
atliko 
Pakeista 9 eilutė iš:
In other words, I take the Liar's paradox  "I contradict myself"  as the nature of truth. I identify with a State of Contradiction ({$ į:
In other words, I take the Liar's paradox  "I contradict myself"  as the nature of truth. I identify with a State of Contradiction ({$ \Rightarrow \Leftarrow $}) and imagining how it gives rise to a State of Noncontradiction (a System). This hinges on exploring the cognitive limits of our imagination. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 20:08
atliko 
Pakeista 9 eilutė iš:
In other words, I take the Liar's paradox  "I contradict myself"  as the nature of truth. I identify with a State of Contradiction ( į:
In other words, I take the Liar's paradox  "I contradict myself"  as the nature of truth. I identify with a State of Contradiction ({$$ \Rightarrow \Leftarrow $$}) and imagining how it gives rise to a State of Noncontradiction (a System). This hinges on exploring the cognitive limits of our imagination. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 20:06
atliko 
Pakeista 9 eilutė iš:
In other words, I take the Liar's paradox  "I contradict myself"  as the nature of truth. I identify with a State of Contradiction ( į:
In other words, I take the Liar's paradox  "I contradict myself"  as the nature of truth. I identify with a State of Contradiction (<math>\Rightarrow \Leftarrow</math>) and imagining how it gives rise to a State of Noncontradiction (a System). This hinges on exploring the cognitive limits of our imagination. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 20:03
atliko 
Pakeista 9 eilutė iš:
In other words, I take the Liar's paradox as the nature of truth. I identify with a State of Contradiction (SoC) and imagining how it gives rise to a State of Noncontradiction (a System). This hinges on exploring the cognitive limits of our imagination. į:
In other words, I take the Liar's paradox  "I contradict myself"  as the nature of truth. I identify with a State of Contradiction (SoC) and imagining how it gives rise to a State of Noncontradiction (a System). This hinges on exploring the cognitive limits of our imagination. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 20:02
atliko 
Pakeistos 910 eilutės iš
į:
In other words, I take the Liar's paradox as the nature of truth. I identify with a State of Contradiction (SoC) and imagining how it gives rise to a State of Noncontradiction (a System). This hinges on exploring the cognitive limits of our imagination. Pridėta 12 eilutė:
2017 gegužės 15 d., 19:48
atliko 
Pakeistos 1315 eilutės iš
A comprehensive theory of truth may implicitly suppose a comprehensive view upon everything. į:
A comprehensive theory of truth may implicitly suppose a comprehensive view upon everything. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 19:46
atliko 
Pakeistos 911 eilutės iš
This definition of truth hinges on I relate į:
This definition of truth hinges on exploring the cognitive limits of our imagination. In particular, it depends on identifying with a State of Contradiction (SoC) and imagining how it gives rise to a State of Noncontradiction (a System). I relate admission of selfcontradiction to Heidegger's "unconcealment" and the orginal Greek term Aletheia to 4 substantialist theories, 2 deflationary theories, 3 pragmatist theories and 6 formal theories described in the Wikipedia article, in English, on Truth. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 19:42
atliko 
Pakeistos 911 eilutės iš
This definition of truth hinges on studying the cognitive limits of our imagination. In particular, it depends on į:
This definition of truth hinges on studying the cognitive limits of our imagination. In particular, it depends on embracing a State of Contradiction (SoC) and imagining how it gives rise to a State of Noncontradiction (a System). I relate this definition of truth to Heidegger's "unconcealment" and the orginal Greek term Aletheia, to 4 substantialist theories, 2 deflationary theories, 3 formal theories, 3 pragmatist theories 2017 gegužės 15 d., 19:32
atliko 
Pridėta 34 eilutė:
* Truth as a distinguished (unmarked?) opposite. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 19:22
atliko 
Pakeista 5 eilutė iš:
[++Truth as Admission of SelfContradiction++] į:
[++Truth as the Admission of SelfContradiction++] 2017 gegužės 15 d., 19:22
atliko 
Pakeistos 57 eilutės iš
[++ I sketch out a definition į:
[++Truth as Admission of SelfContradiction++] I sketch out a definition of truth as the admission of selfcontradiction, and thus as the unique referent beyond a noncontradictory system, that which cannot be hidden, which is ultimately obvious, and by which a statement can be taken at face value, understood without any special reading of its context. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 19:19
atliko 
Pakeista 9 eilutė iš:
This definition of truth hinges on studying the cognitive limits of our imagination. In particular, it depends on imagining how a State of Contradiction (SoC) gives rise to a State of Noncontradiction į:
This definition of truth hinges on studying the cognitive limits of our imagination. In particular, it depends on imagining how a State of Contradiction (SoC) gives rise to a State of Noncontradiction (a System). 2017 gegužės 15 d., 19:18
atliko 
Pakeista 9 eilutė iš:
į:
This definition of truth hinges on studying the cognitive limits of our imagination. In particular, it depends on imagining how a State of Contradiction (SoC) gives rise to a State of Noncontradiction  a System. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 19:09
atliko 
Pakeistos 711 eilutės iš
I sketch out a definition of truth as the unique referent beyond a į:
I sketch out a definition of truth as the unique referent beyond a System, and thus as that which cannot be hidden, which is ultimately obvious, and by which a statement can be taken at face value, understood without any special reading of its context. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 19:05
atliko 
Pakeista 9 eilutė iš:
A comprehensive theory of truth may į:
A comprehensive theory of truth may implicitly suppose a comprehensive view upon everything. I attempt such a view by imagining how a State of Contradiction (SoC) gives rise to a State of Noncontradiction (SoN). As a result, I define truth in a way that relates 13 different theories of truth. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 19:04
atliko 
Pakeistos 79 eilutės iš
į:
I sketch out a definition of truth as the unique referent beyond a system, and thus as that which cannot be hidden, which is ultimately obvious, which can be taken at face value, without and thus need not be marked. A comprehensive theory of truth may understandably suppose a comprehensive view upon everything. I attempt such a view by imagining how a State of Contradiction (SoC) gives rise to a State of Noncontradiction (SoN). As a result, I define truth in a way that relates 13 different theories of truth. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 18:57
atliko 
Pakeista 35 eilutė iš:
* Statements are given by fusing views and concepts. į:
* Statements are given by fusing views and concepts, or content and expression. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 18:56
atliko 
Pridėta 35 eilutė:
* Statements are given by fusing views and concepts. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 18:51
atliko 
Pridėtos 910 eilutės:
SoC goes beyond itself into itself, namely, Everything. Everything is the self of SoC. Pridėtos 1718 eilutės:
* Define going beyond oneself * Define equation of life 2017 gegužės 15 d., 18:49
atliko 
Pakeistos 2223 eilutės iš
* Statements are typically tentative  we don't care to agree absolutely on what they mean  they are į:
* Statements are typically tentative  we don't care to agree absolutely on what they mean  they are * Scopes of truth: everything, anything, something, nothing. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 18:48
atliko 
Pakeistos 910 eilutės iš
Truth as the Unique Referent Beyond a System į:
'''Truth as the Unique Referent Beyond a System''' Pridėta 14 eilutė:
* Define representations 2017 gegužės 15 d., 18:47
atliko 
Pakeistos 56 eilutės iš
[++ į:
[++Imagining the State of Contradiction as the Basis for Truth++] Pridėtos 89 eilutės:
Truth as the Unique Referent Beyond a System 2017 gegužės 15 d., 18:46
atliko 
Pakeista 5 eilutė iš:
[++ į:
[++Truth as the Unique Referent Beyond a System++] 2017 gegužės 15 d., 18:44
atliko 
Pakeistos 2224 eilutės iš
* Truth is į:
* Truth is the unique referent which is beyond a system. And thus by definition truth cannot be solely systemic. But a system of this kind is completely explicit, thus truth is the only thing that is outside it. Truth refers to the original everything. And thus true is the opposite of the good. * Truth is that which can be "unmarked", that which can be without context, without conditions, taken at face value. * Truth is that which cannot be hidden. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 18:39
atliko 
Pakeistos 1819 eilutės iš
* Truth is the gap within a restructuring and is the source of į:
* Truth is the gap within a restructuring and is the source of paradox. * Statements are typically tentative  we don't care to agree absolutely on what they mean  they are 2017 gegužės 15 d., 18:34
atliko 
Pakeista 21 eilutė iš:
* Truth is that which is į:
* Truth is that which is beyond a system. And thus by definition truth cannot be solely systemic. But a system of this kind is completely explicit, thus truth is the only thing that is outside it. Truth refers to the original everything. And thus true is the opposite of the good. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 18:32
atliko 
Pridėta 18 eilutė:
* Truth is the gap within a restructuring and is the source of paradox 2017 gegužės 15 d., 18:31
atliko 
Pakeista 14 eilutė iš:
* Define truth as a representation of the nullsome. And likewise define the representations of the nullsome and ground them in the foursome. į:
* Define truth as a representation of the nullsome  that which cannot be hidden, that which has nothing between expression and content. And likewise define the representations of the nullsome and ground them in the foursome. Pridėta 20 eilutė:
* Truth is that which is 2017 gegužės 15 d., 18:30
atliko 
Pakeistos 1617 eilutės iš
* į:
* Antistructure * Sevensome and eightsome  ways of choosing  sources of mistakes Pakeista 20 eilutė iš:
* Substantial and deflationary theories are the 6 representations. į:
* Substantial and deflationary theories are the 6 representations based on views vs. concepts. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 18:29
atliko 
Pakeista 20 eilutė iš:
* Axiomatic theories are possible (model), actual (proof), necessary ( į:
* Axiomatic theories are possible (model), actual (proof), necessary (logical). 2017 gegužės 15 d., 18:28
atliko 
Pakeista 13 eilutė iš:
į:
My results: Pridėtos 1720 eilutės:
Results related to truth theories: * Substantial and deflationary theories are the 6 representations. * Axiomatic theories are possible (model), actual (proof), necessary (semantic). 2017 gegužės 15 d., 18:19
atliko 
Pridėtos 816 eilutės:
Background: * Define everything * Define divisions of everything Results: * Define truth as a representation of the nullsome. And likewise define the representations of the nullsome and ground them in the foursome. * Define necessary, possible, actual with regard to truth, and similarly define the twelve topologies. * 2017 gegužės 15 d., 17:52
atliko 
Pakeistos 56 eilutės iš
A comprehensive theory of truth may well require a comprehensive view of everything. į:
A comprehensive theory of truth may well require a comprehensive view of everything. I attempt such a view by imagining how a State of Contradiction (SoC) gives rise to a State of Noncontradiction (SoN). As a result, I define truth in a way that relates 13 different theories of truth. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 17:43
atliko 
Pakeistos 35 eilutės iš
[++Imagining the State of Contradiction as a Basis for Truth++] į:
[++Imagining the State of Contradiction as a Basis for Truth++] A comprehensive theory of truth may well require a comprehensive view of everything. 2017 gegužės 15 d., 17:19
atliko 
Pakeista 3 eilutė iš:
[+Imagining the State of Contradiction as a Basis for Truth+] į:
[++Imagining the State of Contradiction as a Basis for Truth++] 2017 gegužės 15 d., 17:19
atliko 
Pakeista 3 eilutė iš:
[+ į:
[+Imagining the State of Contradiction as a Basis for Truth+] 2017 gegužės 15 d., 16:56
atliko 
Pridėtos 13 eilutės:
[[https://formaltruththeories.pl  Warsaw Workshop on Formal Truth Theories]], September 2830, 2017 [+Defining Truth in Terms of the State of Contradiction+] 
20170928TruthNaujausi pakeitimai 
Puslapis paskutinį kartą pakeistas 2017 lapkričio 29 d., 11:43
